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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
PROFESSOR KATSORIS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.
On behalf of the DeStefano Family, I’d like to welcome you here
tonight. This is the thirteenth Annual DeStefano Lecture, and I have had
the privilege of making introductory remarks in all previous DeStefano
Lectures. Tonight is different, however, because unfortunately our good
friend Al passed away a few months ago.
We will greatly miss him. He climbed the ladder of success one
rung at a time. As a night student, he worked his way through law
school, while a member of the Law Review, and he still graduated at the
top of his class. He then went on to become a partner in the Becker
firm, specializing in corporate matters with an emphasis on mergers and
acquisitions. He was active in numerous charitable endeavors and was
an extremely popular adjunct professor on our faculty, sharing his
enormous knowledge and experience with our students. He was all
these things, but most of all he was a devoted husband, father,
grandfather, and a friend. He was a role-model to all those around him.
Al will be missed by all who knew him, but I am consoled by the
words of an old ballad, which I first heard as a young boy and which
still rings in my ears. These words were expressed by General Douglas
MacArthur in his famous farewell speech to Congress over sixty years
ago when he referred to a popular army barracks ballad—“old soldiers
never die, they just fade away,” and “like the old soldier of that ballad, I
now close my . . . career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to
do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.”
Al was just such a soldier who succeeded in whatever he tackled,
and always with grace, compassion, dignity, and integrity. Accordingly,
Al DeStefano will never die and, through this Lecture series, his
memory will never fade away.
Over the years, the DeStefano Lectures have covered a wide range
of timely and diverse topics such as the need for market regulation, the
demise of Enron and its auditor Arthur Andersen, strengthening the
protection for investors, making our capital markets more transparent,
the subprime mortgage meltdown, and greater corporate and
governmental accountability.
Two years ago, we were treated to Judge Rakoff’s thought
provoking lecture entitled “Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes
in an Age of Economic Expertise.” Last year we were treated to
Professor James Stewart’s discussion of those who “Hide Behind the
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Corporate Veil,” which in essence, expanded on the principle of piercing
the corporate veil established by Professor I. Maurice Wormser over a
century ago.
Tonight, we are in for another treat, as our speaker is J. Travis
Laster, a Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery. Vice
Chancellor Laster cannot be described as an old soldier. Indeed, the title
of young warrior is more appropriate, considering how much he has
accomplished at such an early age.
Vice Chancellor Laster received his undergraduate degree from
Princeton summa cum laude and his J.D. and Masters from the
University of Virginia. He clerked for the Honorable Jane R. Roth of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit before beginning a most
successful career in private practice, specializing in litigation and
transactional matters involving Delaware corporations and entities. His
list of accomplishments, awards, and memberships in professional
organizations are too numerous to list and are easily found in Google.
More importantly, Fordham Law School has always associated
itself with the phrase “In the Service of Others.” It should be no
surprise, therefore, that when I was perusing the Vice Chancellor’s
background for purposes of tonight’s introduction, I was most impressed
by an interview he had a few years ago held shortly after his
appointment to the bench.
The question was asked of him: Why did you want to make the
change from private practice to a member of the judiciary?
Vice Chancellor Laster responded: “The call to public service is
very important to me. My parents were models in this regard. They are
both teachers. I always knew that I wanted to do some type of public
service, and being on the Court of Chancery was my ‘dream job.’”
While performing the duties of his dream job, he has authored and
participated in many important opinions, not the least of which is his
relatively recent opinion in In re Revlon, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.1
That case involved a challenge to a proposed merger between Revlon
and its controlling shareholder. In a forty-six page opinion, he
challenged a practice where some law firms would engage in
opportunistic filings of representative actions on behalf of shareholders
with small stakes, only to let the litigation lie dormant until settlement
and the collection of their fees. He described such conduct as “frequent
1.

990 A.2d 940 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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filer” plaintiffs’ counsel in shareholder class actions and proceeded to
replace co-lead counsel—in effect raising the bar as to what constitutes
acceptable performance by counsel in such important litigation.
Tonight, Vice Chancellor Laster’s topic of discussion is “Revlon is
a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It Means.” But that is
not the same Revlon discussion referred to previously. The Revlon
decision to be discussed tonight, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.,2 written over twenty-five years ago, dealt with the
difficult issue of what are the duties and conduct of directors in cases
involving mergers and acquisitions and whether their actions are
reasonable—a discussion involving many varying factors; and, there is
no one better equipped to discuss this subject than our speaker tonight.
It is my great pleasure to introduce the Vice Chancellor of the
Chancery Court of Delaware—the Honorable J. Travis Laster.

2.

506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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INTRODUCTION
Powerful imagery from the Revlon decision1 has long influenced
Delaware’s mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) jurisprudence. In that
landmark 1986 opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that when a
board of directors stops resisting a hostile takeover and decides to sell
the corporation, the directors’ role changes “from defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for
the stockholders at a sale of the company.”2 Adding bite to the
metaphor, the court held that the Revlon directors breached their
fiduciary duties in selling the corporation for cash to their chosen bidder,
and the court enjoined the parties from complying with certain aspects
of the merger agreement.3 Both the language and result of the decision
suggested the existence of special “Revlon duties,” a set of affirmative
conduct obligations imposed by the Delaware courts in particular factual
circumstances that require directors to take certain actions and forgo
others.
Nearly thirty years of subsequent judicial development have
readied this stereotypical interpretation for well-deserved retirement.
Revlon is now understood to be a form of enhanced scrutiny, the
innovative standard of review created in Unocal.4 Revlon does not
establish special duties or impose particular conduct obligations on
directors.5 Rather, it is a standard of review under which the extent of
judicial deference given to board decisions narrows from rationality to
range-of-reasonableness.6
Although post-millennial Delaware opinions consistently describe
Revlon as a standard of review, echoes of “Revlon duties” reverberate in
Delaware law’s nominally disparate treatment of third-party mergers.7
If the merger consideration consists of cash, then Revlon applies. If the
merger consideration takes the form of stock, then Revlon does not
apply. But, if the consolidated entity would have a controlling
1.
1986).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
Id. at 182.
See id.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
See discussion infra Part I.B.
See discussion infra Parts II and III.
See discussion infra Part I.B.
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stockholder, then Revlon applies again.8 The divergent treatment stems
from two well-known Delaware Supreme Court decisions: TimeWarner9 and QVC.10 Both of these cases involved Paramount
Communications Corporation, so the resulting patchwork of standards
appropriately can be labeled the “Paramount doctrine.”11
Because Revlon is a standard of review, Delaware law no longer
needs the Paramount doctrine.12 As decisions by the Delaware Supreme
Court and the Court of Chancery explain, the potential conflicts of
interest present in a negotiated acquisition provide the impetus for
applying enhanced Revlon scrutiny.13 Those conflicts exist regardless of
the form of consideration or whether the post-merger entity would have
a controlling stockholder.14 Therefore, enhanced scrutiny should apply
to all negotiated acquisitions, and as a practical matter, it already does.15
Only the Delaware Supreme Court can get rid of the Paramount
doctrine, and in my personal view, the high court can and should
officially bid it farewell.

8. To simplify the terminology in this Article, “stock-for-stock merger” refers to a
stock-for-stock transaction in which the surviving company emerges without a
controlling stockholder, and “Revlon deal” refers to a cash sale or transaction in which
the surviving company emerges with a controlling stockholder.
9. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 571
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). Chancellor Allen’s written opinion, which the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed as to result on the Revlon issues, remains equally important.
See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 700 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
10. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount Commc’ns
Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
11. By 1995, two Delaware Supreme Court decisions had crystallized the
Paramount doctrine into a formalistic three-part test for triggering so-called “Revlon
duties.” See In re Santa Fe Pac. S’holders Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995); Arnold v.
Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1290 (Del. 1994). Although the
triggering test largely ossified at that point, Revlon praxis continued to evolve.
12. See discussion infra Part III.
13. See discussion infra Part II.
14. See id.
15. See id.
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I. FROM UNOCAL TO REVLON
Until the watershed year of 1985, Delaware recognized only two
standards of review for evaluating board decisions: the business
judgment rule16 and the entire fairness test.17 The two doctrines
reflected a binary world view in which directors fell into one of two
categories: independent and disinterested directors who made decisions
that a court would have no cause to second-guess and interested
directors who made decisions that were inherently suspect.
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that when
responding to a takeover bid, target management and the incumbent
directors face a potential conflict of interest.18 The directors are not
“interested” in the traditional sense as they would be if they were
transacting with the corporation.19 However, they are not truly
disinterested or independent either, because the hostile bid threatens
their positions with the corporation.20 The resulting structural conflict
muddies the waters for purposes of judicial review. If the directors
resist a hostile bid, they could well be acting in good faith and loyally
for the commendable purpose of protecting the stockholders’ interests.

16. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (formulating the business
judgment rule in its contemporary form); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d
660, 663 (Del. 1952) (citing “the universally acknowledged principle of law which
leaves many matters to be finally settled by the sound business judgment of the
directors” but finding that judicial review is required “[w]hen a board acts under a
misconception of the law on a vital point”); Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 47 A.2d 479,
486 (Del. 1946) (“If it appears that [the board of directors] acted honestly, they are not
responsible for mere mistakes, and under such circumstances, Courts will not interfere
with their action or attempt to assume their authority to act.”).
17. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983)
(formulating entire fairness test in its contemporary form); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109 (Del. 1952) (“Since [the defendant directors] stand on both
sides of the transaction, they bear the burden of establishing its entire fairness, and it
must pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”); Keenan v. Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904,
908 (Del. 1938) (explaining that where directors were interested in the challenged
transaction, they “assumed the burden of showing the entire fairness of the transaction”)
(citing Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921)).
18. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
19. See id. at 957.
20. See id.
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Or they could be succumbing to their own self-interest. Unocal
famously described this potential conflict as the “omnipresent specter
that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than
those of the corporation and its shareholders.”21
To address this concern, Unocal announced a new, intermediate
standard of review under which the directors bear the burden of showing
(i) “reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness existed” and (ii) a response to the danger that was
“reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”22 The Delaware Supreme
Court required that the directors satisfy this test to “ensure that a
defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is indeed motivated
by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its
stockholders.”23 Enhanced scrutiny—an intermediate standard of
review—was born.
One year after Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court’s Revlon
decision applied the new intermediate standard to the sale of a
corporation.24 Although the high court repeatedly stated that it was
applying Unocal to the facts of the case, the Revlon opinion had a
different tone and reached a strikingly different outcome.25 In Unocal,
the Delaware Supreme Court found for the defendants and praised their
actions.26 Even though the directors adopted a discriminatory debt-forequity exchange offer in response to a hostile bid, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the defensive response was reasonable in
relation to the threat posed.27 By contrast, in Revlon, the plaintiffs
won.28 The Delaware Supreme Court criticized the directors’ conduct
and held that they breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to sell the
corporation for cash in a premium-generating transaction.29 As a
remedy, the Delaware Supreme Court enjoined the defendants from

21.
22.
23.
24.

1986).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 954.
Id. at 955.
Id.
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
See id. at 180–82.
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956–57.
See id.
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185.
See id.
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proceeding with certain aspects of the merger agreement.30 For those
who confronted the decisions in real time, the Delaware Supreme Court
seemed not to have simply applied Unocal, but rather to have done
something radically different.31
Doctrinally, at least two aspects of Revlon appeared to depart from
Unocal. The first was Revlon’s failure to clearly identify a potential
conflict. In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court specifically cited
entrenchment as the potential conflict and invoked the “omnipresent
specter” of director self-interest.32 In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme
Court did not clearly identify a potential conflict, and the fact that the
directors were selling the company seemed to negate any entrenchment
motive.33 To the extent that concerns of potential disloyalty animated
Unocal, similar concerns did not leap off the page in Revlon.
A second distinguishing factor was Revlon’s prominent language
that seemed to contemplate affirmative duties for the selling board,
including a potential duty to auction.34 In the ringing words of the
30.
31.

See id.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in
Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 802 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge,
Director Primacy] (“[F]or many, the differences between Unocal and Revlon loomed
large.”); Ross W. Wooten, Restructurings During a Hostile Takeover: Directors’
Discretion or Shareholders’ Choice?, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 505, 519 (1998) (“It is apparent
that there are two standards . . . .”); Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile
Takeovers: The Impact of QVC and Its Progeny, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 945, 962 (1995)
(“[T]here is much practical difference between the Unocal and Revlon modes of
analysis.”).
32. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
33. See Paul L. Regan, The Unimportance of Being Earnest: Paramount Rewrites
the Rules for Enhanced Scrutiny in Corporate Takeovers, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 125, 158–
65 (1994).
34. See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181 (explaining that “the fiduciary standards
outlined in Unocal . . . require the directors to determine the best interests of the
corporation and its stockholders, and impose an enhanced duty to abjure any action that
is motivated by considerations other than a good faith concern for such interests”); id. at
182 (stating that “[t]he Revlon board’s authorization permitting management to
negotiate a merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company was
for sale” and that “[t]he duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of
Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for
the stockholders’ benefit”); id. at 184 (stating that “[t]he no-shop provision, like the
lock-up option, while not per se illegal, is impermissible under the Unocal standards
when a board’s primary duty becomes that of an auctioneer responsible for selling the
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opinion, once the Revlon directors decided to sell the company, they
became “auctioneers charged with getting the best price.”35 To fully
appreciate the contemporary effect of this language, recall that just one
year earlier, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held
directors personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties by selling
their corporation for cash in a single-bidder process that the court
deemed inadequate.36 Taken together, Revlon and Van Gorkom seemed
to tell directors to conduct auctions or else. It is difficult to imagine a
more effective way of searing into the minds of deal planners a belief
that certain situations impose special duties on directors.
A. THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT DRIVING REVLON
Over the ensuing three decades, the Delaware courts have identified
the potential conflicts of interest that warrant applying enhanced
scrutiny in a Revlon scenario: those inherent in the sale of the
corporation. Just as Unocal focused on the potential conflicts created by
a hostile bid,37 Revlon focused on the potential conflicts created by a
sale.38 The Revlon decision really was applying Unocal, just as the
Delaware Supreme Court said.39
Numerous Delaware decisions have explained these conflicts. In
the words of the El Paso opinion, “the potential sale of a corporation has
enormous implications for corporate managers and advisors, and a range
of human motivations, including but by no means limited to greed, can
inspire fiduciaries and their advisers to be less than faithful.”40 The
Dollar Thrifty case elaborates on this point:
The heightened scrutiny that applies in the Revlon (and Unocal)
contexts are, in large measure, rooted in a concern that the board
company to the highest bidder”); id. (“[W]hen bidders make relatively similar offers, or
dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot fulfill their
enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending factions.”); id. (“[T]he
shareholders’ interests necessitated that the board remain free to negotiate.”).
35. Id. at 182.
36. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens,
965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
37. See Unocal, 493 A.2d 946.
38. See Revlon, 506 A.2d 173.
39. See id. at 180–81.
40. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012).
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might harbor personal motivations in the sale context that differ from
what is best for the corporation and its stockholders. Most
traditionally, there is the danger that top corporate managers will
resist a sale that might cost them their managerial posts, or prefer a
sale to one industry rival rather than another for reasons having more
41
to do with personal ego than with what is best for stockholders.

Executives may have “an incentive to favor a particular bidder (or type
of bidder),” especially if “some bidders might desire to retain existing
management or to provide them with future incentives while others
might not.”42 Alternatively, managers may seek out a transaction that
41. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986) (“No one
likes to be fired, whether he is just a director or also an officer.”).
42. In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 194 (Del. Ch.
2007); see El Paso, 41 A.3d at 445 (noting that a post-sale MBO of certain assets
“would allow [the CEO] to monetize a large part of his company-specific investment in
El Paso, while permitting him the chance to continue to participate in managing key
assets he knew and for another equity pop in the future”); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc.
S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 692–93 (Del. Ch. 2001) (noting that target company’s
top officers bargained for increased severance compensation in anticipation of potential
sale); Goodwin v. Live Entm’t Inc., No. Civ.A. 15765, 1999 WL 64265, at *19 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 25, 1999) (noting that management was “likely to be retained, had discussed
better contracts, and might obtain such contracts after the merger”); see also Netsmart,
924 A.2d at 198 (“Rightly or wrongly, strategic buyers might sense that CEOs are more
interested in doing private equity deals that leave them as CEOs than strategic deals that
may, and in this case, certainly, would not.”); cf. In re SS & C Techs. Inc. S’holders
Litig., 911 A.2d 816, 820 (Del. Ch. 2006) (declining to approve disclosure-only
settlement where record supported inference that CEO “instigated this transaction
through the use of corporate resources, but without prior authorization from the board
of directors . . . in order to identify a transaction in which he could both realize a
substantial cash pay-out for some of his shares and use his remaining shares and options
to fund a sizeable investment in the resulting entity”). Private equity buyers are not the
only acquirers who retain management. Top executives may well favor those strategic
buyers who have expressed interest in retaining, or would be more likely to retain, the
existing team. A large strategic buyer considering a “bolt-on” acquisition in which
existing management would continue to operate the business unit might seem more
attractive and be favored over a smaller strategic acquirer for whom removal of existing
management would become part of the synergies gained from the deal. See, e.g., In re
Atheros Commc’ns, Inc., C.A. No. 6124-VCN, 2011 WL 864928, at *11–12 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 4, 2011) (requiring disclosure of the fact that CEO would be employed by
strategic acquirer). Advisors may have reasons of their own to favor particular buyers,
categories of buyers, or types of transactions. See, e.g., In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders
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protects their personal wealth at a time when their individual investment
horizons differ from those of diversified stockholders.43
The potential conflicts in a sale may involve non-financial
considerations. As the RJR Nabisco case explains,
[g]reed is not the only human emotion that can pull one from the
path of propriety; so might hatred, lust, envy, revenge, or, as is here
alleged, shame or pride. Indeed any human emotion may cause a
director to place his own interests, preferences or appetites before
44
the welfare of the corporation.

In Time-Warner, for example, when evaluating the Time board’s
deep-seated commitment to its chosen transaction with Warner,
Chancellor Allen observed that
[t]here may be at work here a force more subtle than a desire to
maintain a title or office in order to assure continued salary or
prerequisites. Many people commit a huge portion of their lives to a
single large-scale business organization. They derive their identity in
part from that organization and feel that they contribute to the
identity of the firm. The mission of the firm is not seen by those

Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 542 (Del. Ch. 2003) (noting that target’s financial advisor “had an
incentive to prefer a sale over a liquidation of the company because its fee agreement
provided it with additional payments for a sale”); Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 199 (noting
that for the target’s financial advisor, “[t]he path of dealing with a discrete set of private
equity players was attractive to its primary client contact—management—and the
quickest (and lowest cost) route to a definitive sales agreement”).
43. See In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 114–15 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(finding CEO nearing retirement was motivated by his desire to secure his nest egg); In
re Prime Hospitality, Inc., No. Civ.A. 652-N, 2005 WL 1138738, at *12 (Del. Ch. May
4, 2005) (refusing to approve settlement of stockholder litigation in part because of a
CEO conflict of interest that made the compromised claims relatively strong).
44. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1132, 1159 (Del.
Ch. 1989); see El Paso, 41 A.3d at 439 (“[A] range of human motivations . . . can
inspire fiduciaries and their advisors to be less than faithful to their contextual duty to
pursue the best value for the company’s stockholders.”). See generally Sean J. Griffith,
Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1947
(2003) [hereinafter Griffith, Last Period] (“Directors and managers may favor one deal
over another because it is more in line with their self image and view of the world or
because it is more likely to cause them to be remembered fondly by employees or the
business press.”).
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involved with it as wholly economic, nor the continued existence of
45
its distinctive identity as a matter of indifference.

Consequently, the “paradigmatic context for a good Revlon claim . . . is
when a supine board under the sway of an overweening CEO bent on a
certain direction [] tilts the sales process for reasons inimical to the
stockholders’ desire for the best price.”46 Those inimical reasons may
be financial, non-financial, or both.
When the Delaware Supreme Court issued the Revlon opinion, the
arresting vision of directors transforming into auctioneers overwhelmed
the references to the conflicts that infected the Revlon directors’
decisions. Subsequent analysis has identified at least two conflicts.
First, the Delaware Supreme Court was concerned that “Revlon’s CEO,
Michel Bergerac, rebuffed Pantry Pride’s acquisition overtures in part
because of the ‘strong personal antipathy’ felt by Bergerac towards
Pantry Pride’s CEO, Ron Perelman, who was an upstart from Philly and
not someone whom the Supreme Court believed Bergerac wanted
running his storied company.”47 Second, the directors appeared fixated
on obtaining a transaction that would “shor[e] up the sagging market
value of [recently issued notes] in the face of threatened litigation by
their holders.”48 Although the note holders were former Revlon
stockholders who received their notes as part of the board’s initial
defensive response to Pantry Pride,49 the directors’ continuing concern

45. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 715 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); accord
Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co. (In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig.), 926 A.2d 58, 90 (Del.
Ch. 2007) (“[I]t is often the case that founders (and sons of founders) believe that their
businesses stand for something more than their stock price. Founders therefore often
care how their family legacy—in the form of a corporate culture that treats workers and
consumers well, or a commitment to product quality—will fare if the corporation is
placed under new stewardship.”).
46. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holders Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1002 (Del. Ch. 2005);
see Topps Co., 926 A.2d at 64 (“When directors bias the process against one bidder and
toward another not in a reasoned effort to maximize advantage for the stockholders, but
to tilt the process toward the bidder more likely to continue current management, they
commit a breach of fiduciary duty.”).
47. El Paso, 41 A.3d at 439 n.24 (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)).
48. 506 A.2d at 182.
49. See id. at 177.
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about the note holders carried overtones of self-interest that derived
from the risk of personal liability and reputational damage.50 The
Delaware Supreme Court concluded that “under all the circumstances[,]
the directors allowed considerations other than the maximization of
shareholder profit to affect their judgment.”51 Confirming that the
conflicts drove the analysis, the Delaware Supreme Court described
Revlon three years later as “merely one of an unbroken line of cases that
seek to prevent the conflicts of interest that arise in the field of mergers
and acquisitions.”52
These actual and potential conflicts arise because “a negotiated
corporate acquisition is a paradigmatic example of a final period
problem.”53 Economists use this term to refer to a recurring setting in
which humans struggle with self-interest:
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 184.
Id. at 185.
Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989); see In re
Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 731 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d, 757 A.2d 1278
(Del. 2000) (describing Revlon as “an important comment on the need for heightened
judicial scrutiny when reviewing situations that present unique agency cost problems”);
W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. S’holders
Litig.), 542 A.2d 770, 771 (Del. Ch. 1988) (positing that Revlon is best viewed as a
duty of loyalty case); In re Fort Howard Corp. S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 699,
722 (Del. Ch. 1988) (observing that Revlon was “essentially a breach of loyalty case in
which the board was not seen as acting in the good faith pursuit of the shareholders’
interests”).
53. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 31, at 789; accord Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Story of Smith v. Van Gorkom, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 219, 223
(J. Mark Ramseyer, ed., 2009) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Story of Van Gorkom]
(“Corporate acquisitions are a classic example of what game theories refer to as ‘final
period problems.’”); see Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An
Appraisal of Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 616 (2004) [hereinafter
Griffith, Precommitment] (“Acquisitions create a last period scenario for target
managers and directors because the reorganization of the corporate structure following
the transaction is likely either to end their tenure or, at the very least, significantly
change their role in the company.”); Griffith, Last Period, supra note 44, at 1945
(“Although the drama and hyperbole of a bust up acquisition is typically not present in
the context of a ‘friendly’ merger—after all, the business continues to operate and many
employees keep their jobs—last period features are still present at the level of the board
of directors and senior management, many of whom are likely to be in the last period of
their employment.”); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law:
The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 536 (2002)
[hereinafter Black & Kraakman, Hidden Value] (“In [negotiated acquisitions], the
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In a situation where parties expect to have repeated transactions, the
recognition that a party who cheats in one transaction will be
penalized by the other party in subsequent transactions reduces the
incentive to cheat. However, when a transaction is the last (or only)
in a series—that is, the final period—the incentive to cheat reappears
54
because, by definition, the penalty for doing so has disappeared.

Similar incentives “are manifest in a number of our commonly held
intuitions regarding human behavior, including the landlord’s suspicion
that tenants may skip out on their final month’s rent and the possibility
that temporary or short term employees may shirk.”55
When a corporation operates in the ordinary course of business, the
ability of managers to shirk or self-deal is ordinarily constrained not
only by legal duties but also by a range of markets, including the
product markets, capital markets, employment markets, and the market
for corporate control.56 However, when the manager/stockholder
relationship enters its final period, market constraints have less bite
because the target’s shareholders will be bought out by the acquirer.
Target management is no longer subject to market discipline because
the target, by definition, will no longer operate in the market as an
independent agency. As a result, management is less vulnerable to
57
both shareholder and market penalties for self-dealing.

target’s managers and board will likely lose their positions. They face a strong conflict
of interest, yet they are in a final period where reputation and fear of future discipline
lose their force as constraints on self-interested behavior.”); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37, 54 (1990) (“A
friendly merger in which the ownership of a constituent company remains diffuse but
de facto control shifts from one management team to another, is no less a control shift
than a transaction that gives rise to a control block . . . . [T]he absence of [a controller] .
. . does not reduce the danger that [stockholder] interests will suffer under the merger
terms negotiated by their own management.”).
54. Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 720 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
55. Griffith, Precommitment, supra note 53, at 616.
56. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 31, at 785 (“Corporate directors
operate within a pervasive web of accountability mechanisms that substitute for
monitoring by residual claimants. A variety of market forces provide important
constraints. The capital and product markets, the internal and external employment
markets, and the market for corporate control all constrain shirking by firm agents.”).
57. Id. at 789.
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With typical constraints loosened, the bidder and management may find
ways to “effectively divert[] a portion of the merger consideration from
the shareholders to the management team.”58 Available vehicles include
“an equity stake in the surviving entity, employment or noncompetition
contracts, substantial severance payments, continuation of existing
fringe benefits[,] or other compensation arrangements.”59 Even if the
diverted consideration does not materially decrease the price that the
bidder would pay to the public stockholders, “side payments may affect
management’s decision making by causing them to agree to an
acquisition price lower than that which could be obtained from hard
bargaining or open bidding.”60
The final period also “signals a time when otherwise common
behavioral biases may lead to serious deviations from the welfare of the
corporation and its shareholders.”61 These include familiar cognitive
biases such as overconfidence, excessive optimism, groupthink, reactive
devaluation, and in-group/out-group thinking.62 As Chancellor Allen
recognized, the human psyche has a powerful ability “to rationalize as
right that which is merely personally beneficial.”63 Chancellor Chandler
similarly understood that “[h]uman judgment can be clouded by subtle
influences like the prestige and perquisites of board membership,
personal relationships with management, or animosity towards a
bidder.”64
The existence of these influences does not mean that managers and
directors inevitably breach their duties. Delaware law does not embrace
“the notion that persons suffering from conflicts are invariably incapable
of putting them aside,” but it also does not “ignore the reality that
American business history is littered with examples of managers who
exploited the opportunity to work both sides of a deal.”65 It is the risk of
favoritism that provides “good reason to be skeptical of management

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Griffith, Last Period, supra note 44, at 1947 (footnotes omitted).
Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 31, at 788 (footnotes omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted).
Griffith, Last Period, supra note 44, at 1948.
See id. at 1949–53.
City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch.

1988).
64. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2010).
65. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 117 (Del. Ch. 2007).

18

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XIX

claims to be acting in the shareholders’ best interests.”66 Therefore, a
negotiated acquisition is one of those “rare situations which mandate
that a court take a more direct and active role in overseeing the decisions
made and actions taken by directors.”67 “[T]he resulting need in this
context to hold the board accountable for its mistakes appropriately
trumps the usual tendency towards judicial deference to the board’s
authority.”68
In short, just like Unocal, Revlon addresses a situation in which
potential conflicts of interest call for applying greater scrutiny than the
business judgment rule permits.
[W]here heightened scrutiny applies, the predicate question of what
the board’s true motivation was comes into play. The court must take
a nuanced and realistic look at the possibility that personal interests
short of pure self-dealing have influenced the board to block a bid
[Unocal] or to steer a deal to one bidder rather than another
[Revlon]. Through this examination, the court seeks to assure itself
that the board acted reasonably, in the sense of taking a logical and
reasoned approach for the purpose of advancing a proper objective,
and to thereby smoke out mere pretextual justifications for
improperly motivated decisions. In this sense, the reasonableness
standard requires the court to consider for itself whether the board is
truly well motivated (i.e., is it acting for the proper ends?) before
ultimately determining whether its means were themselves a
reasonable way of advancing those ends. As one would expect, when
the record reveals no basis to question the board’s good faith desire
to attain the proper end, the court will be more likely to defer to the
69
board’s judgment about the means to get there.

Revlon applies to negotiated acquisitions because “there is a basis for
concern that directors without a pure self-dealing motive might be
influenced by considerations other than the best interests of the
corporation and other stockholders.”70

66.
67.

Bainbridge, Story of Van Gorkom, supra note 53, at 224.
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount Commc’ns
Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1993).
68. Bainbridge, Story of Van Gorkom, supra note 53, at 224.
69. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598–600 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(footnotes omitted).
70. Id. at 599 n.181; see QVC, 637 A.2d at 42 & n.9 (contrasting “those rare
situations which mandate that a court . . . subject[] the directors’ conduct to enhanced
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B. THE CHIMERA OF REVLON DUTIES
As noted, although Revlon literally applied the still-new Unocal
standard of review, language in the opinion suggested affirmative
conduct obligations for directors.71 Over the ensuing decades, the
Delaware courts have clarified that Revlon does not impose specific
conduct requirements. Revlon instead calls upon a court to determine
whether the directors’ decisions fell within a “range of
reasonableness”—precisely the same standard applied under Unocal.72
Neither decision imposes affirmative conduct obligations. Both applied
an intermediate standard of review now recognized as enhanced
scrutiny.
The Delaware Supreme Court squarely held in QVC that the
standard for a Revlon analysis is “range-of-reasonableness,” just like
Unocal:
There are many business and financial considerations implicated in
investigating and selecting the best value reasonably available. The
board of directors is the corporate decision-making body best
equipped to make those judgments. Accordingly, a court applying
enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the directors
made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a board
selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should not
second-guess that choice even though it might have decided
otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s
determination. Thus, courts will not substitute their business

scrutiny” with situations where “[a]ctual self-interest is present and affects a majority of
the directors,” to which entire fairness applies). See generally Julian Velasco,
Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 870–83
(2004).
71. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
72. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig.), 651
A.2d 1361, 1385–86 (Del. 1995) (adopting “range of reasonableness” test for Unocal
review); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding
that directors must prove that they selected a response that was “reasonable in relation
to the threat posed”); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles A. Yablon,
Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and
the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. L. 1593, 1605–20 (1994) (describing evolution of
Delaware cases towards single standard of reasonableness).
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judgment for that of the directors, but will determine if the directors’
73
decision was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness.

The duty to act reasonably requires that a reasonable course of action be
taken under the circumstances.74 Because there could be several
reasoned ways to proceed in a situation, “the court cannot find fault so
long as the directors chose a reasoned course of action.”75
Consistent with Revlon operating as a reasonableness standard, the
Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that there are no specific
Revlon duties.76 Examining the particular duties that Revlon was once
thought to impose makes this fact all the more clear.
1. No Duty to Conduct an Auction or Follow Judicially Prescribed Steps
Revlon does not create a duty to auction or require that directors
adhere to judicially prescribed steps to maximize stockholder value.77
73.
74.
75.

637 A.2d at 45.
See In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 115 (Del. Ch. 2007).
Id.; see QVC, 637 A.2d at 42 (“[A] court subjects the directors’ conduct to
enhanced scrutiny to ensure that it is reasonable.”); Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 599 n.181
(explaining that as a form of enhanced scrutiny, Revlon “requir[es] that the directors
demonstrate that their decision was well-motivated and was a reasonable way to
advance the proper interests they must serve, which are the best interests of the
corporation and the stockholders”).
76. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001) (“In our view,
Revlon neither creates a new type of fiduciary duty in the sale-of-control context nor
alters the nature of the fiduciary duties that generally apply.”); see also Lyondell Chem.
Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (“[T]here are no legally prescribed steps
that directors must follow to satisfy their Revlon duties.”); QVC, 637 A.2d at 43 (“The
directors’ fiduciary duties in a sale of control context are those which generally attach.
In short, ‘the directors must act in accordance with their fundamental duties of care and
loyalty.’”); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (“[T]he
basic teaching of [Revlon and Unocal] is simply that the directors must act in
accordance with their fundamental duties of care and loyalty.”); Mills Acquisition Co.
v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989) (“Beyond [seeking the alternative
offering the best value reasonably available for stockholders], there are no special and
distinct ‘Revlon duties.’”); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 731 (Del.
Ch. 1999) (“‘Revlon duties’ refer only to a director’s performance of his or her duties of
care, good faith and loyalty in the unique factual circumstance of a sale of control over
the corporate enterprise.”).
77. See Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286 (“Revlon does not demand that every change in
the control of a Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated bidding contest.”);
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The Delaware Supreme Court has stated explicitly that “there is no
single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its duties[, and a]
stereotypical approach to the sale and acquisition of corporate control is
not to be expected.”78 In Dollar Thrifty, the Court of Chancery
summarized these principles:
As is well known, Revlon does not require that a board, in
determining the value-maximizing transaction, follow any specific
plan or roadmap in meeting its duty to take reasonable steps to
secure—i.e., actually attain—the best immediate value . . . . Thus,
although the level of judicial scrutiny under Revlon is more exacting
than the deferential rationality standard applied to run-of-the-mill
decisions by the business judgment rule, at bottom Revlon is a test of
reasonableness: directors are generally free to select the path to value
maximization, so long as they choose a reasonable route to get
79
there.

The reviewing court looks at whether the board acted reasonably “by
undertaking a logically sound process to get the best deal that is
realistically attainable.”80
A board acting reasonably can decide to negotiate with a single
bidder.81 A board faced with competing offers may choose a nominally
lower bid that provides more certainty of value or poses fewer risks.82 A
Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 595–96 (describing judicial scrutiny under Revlon); id. at 600
(“Revlon is often mistakenly referred to as creating a duty to auction.”); In re Netsmart
Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The mere fact that a
board did not, for example, do a canvass of all possible acquirers before signing up an
acquisition agreement does not mean that [the board] necessarily acted unreasonably.”).
78. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286; accord Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 192 (“This duty, often
called a Revlon duty, does not, of course, require every board to follow a judicially
prescribed checklist of sales activities.”).
79. Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 595–96 (footnotes and internal quotation marks
omitted).
80. Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 192.
81. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286; Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 604.
82. See, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 65–68
(Del. 1989) (finding no breach of duty under either business judgment review or
enhanced scrutiny where a board rejected potentially higher two-tier offer for an allcash bid and holding that board acted reasonably in determining that two-tier bid
delivered less value because of conditionality); Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan, 24 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 688, 714–15 (Del. Ch. 1998) (finding no breach of duty under enhanced
scrutiny where board rejected facially higher cash bid and accepted nominally lower
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board can grant favorable treatment to a particular bidder or class of
bidders if the board reasonably seeks to promote stockholder interests.83
If circumstances warrant, a board may reasonably decide not to contact
“a known interested party who might be willing to offer more.”84
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Lyondell should have
eliminated any lingering belief that Revlon might impose some form of
conduct requirement.85 There, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
the Court of Chancery erred by identifying several possible means by
which the directors could have done more to explore alternatives before
agreeing to a transaction.86 In the Delaware Supreme Court’s view, the
Court of Chancery erroneously concluded “that directors must follow
one of several courses of action to satisfy their Revlon duties.”87 In
correcting the trial court’s error, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that
“no court can tell directors exactly how to accomplish [the goal of
obtaining the best value reasonably available] because they will be
facing a unique combination of circumstances, many of which will be
outside their control.”88 And if no court can tell directors what to do

cash bid and holding board acted reasonably in determining that facially higher bid
delivered less value because of time-value of money, conditionality, and greater risk of
non-consummation); Norberg v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 358–59
(Del. Ch. 1989) (refusing to enjoin a management buyout based on speculation that a
higher offer could be procured); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1132, 1159 (Del. Ch. 1989) (finding that board acted reasonably in choosing
nominally lower bid over competing management buyout); Freedman v. Rest. Assocs.
Indus., Inc., 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651, 667 (Del. Ch. 1987) (noting that board may prefer
a nominally lower bid that has a higher likelihood of closing).
83. See Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 617 (finding reasonable board’s decision to enter
into a merger agreement that “set a floor under the market price . . ., left its stockholders
with the choice of turning down the deal at relatively low cost, and [created] the chance
to reap more from a bidder . . . who might show up”); In re Fort Howard Corp.
S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 699, 722 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“Revlon explicitly
recognized that a disinterested board . . . may enter into lock-up agreements if the effect
was to promote, not to impede shareholder interests. That can only mean if the
intended effect is such, for the validity of the agreement itself cannot be made to turn
upon how accurately the board did foresee the future.”).
84. Golden Cycle, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 712.
85. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
86. See id. at 242.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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when pursuing a negotiated acquisition, then Revlon cannot impose
specific conduct requirements.
2. No Obligation to Retain the Right to Terminate to Take a Better Deal
Revlon also does not mandate that a board retain the right to
terminate a merger agreement to take a better deal, nor does it magically
confer such a right on directors by virtue of their status as fiduciaries.
The Delaware Supreme Court addressed these issues in Van Gorkom,89
which “established that Delaware law does not give directors, just
because they are fiduciaries, the right to accept better offers, distribute
information to potential new bidders, or change their recommendation
with respect to a merger agreement even if circumstances have
changed.”90 The Delaware Supreme Court has never modified or
overruled Van Gorkom on these points, and it certainly did not do so in
Revlon, which twice cited Van Gorkom with approval.91 Nor did Revlon
announce a new, post-Van Gorkom rule: to the contrary, the Delaware
89.
90.

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
R. Franklin Balotti & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Deal-Protection Measures and
the Merger Recommendation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 467, 468–69 (2002) (footnote
omitted); accord William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and the
Why of an Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW. 653, 654 (2000) (“One of the holdings of
the Delaware Supreme Court in Van Gorkom was that corporate directors have no
fiduciary right (as opposed to power) to breach a contract.”) (footnotes omitted); John
F. Johnston, Recent Amendments to the Merger Sections of the DGCL Will Eliminate
Some—But Not All—Fiduciary Out Negotiation and Drafting Issues, 1 MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS L. REP. (BNA) No. 20, 777, 778 (1998) (“[T]here is . . . no public policy
that permits fiduciaries to terminate an otherwise binding agreement because a better
deal has come along, or circumstances have changed.”); A. Gilchrist Sparks, III,
Merger Agreements Under Delaware Law—When Can Directors Change Their
Minds?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 815, 817 (1997) (“[Van Gorkom] makes it clear that
under Delaware law there is no implied fiduciary out or trump card permitting a board
to terminate a merger agreement before it is sent to a stockholder vote.”); John F.
Johnston & Frederick H. Alexander, Fiduciary Outs and Exclusive Merger
Agreements—Delaware Law and Practice, 11 INSIGHTS, NO. 2, 15, 15 (1997) (“[T]he
Delaware Supreme Court held that directors of Delaware corporations may not rely on
their status as fiduciaries as a basis for (1) terminating a merger agreement due to
changed circumstances, including a better offer; or (2) negotiating with other bidders in
order to develop a competing offer.”).
91. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179, 185
(Del. 1986).
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Supreme Court has held that Revlon’s principles applied retroactively to
pre-1986 transactions because the Revlon opinion’s holding was
“derived from fundamental principles of corporate law” and “did not
produce a seismic shift in the law governing changes of corporate
control.”92 There are no grounds to distinguish Revlon from Van
Gorkom based on transaction structure: the Van Gorkom decision
involved a negotiated cash deal to which Revlon indisputably would
have applied.93 Indeed, there is now a broad consensus that Van
Gorkom was not actually a duty-of-care case, but rather the Delaware
Supreme Court’s initial—albeit unacknowledged—enhanced scrutiny
case.94
92. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 n.2 (Del. 1989); accord
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (applying enhanced
scrutiny under Revlon to a pre-Revlon transaction).
93. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868–69 (describing terms of challenged
merger as acquisition of TransUnion by an entity controlled by the Pritzker family for
$55 per share in cash).
94. See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 602 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(“Van Gorkom, after all, was really a Revlon case.”) (footnotes omitted); Gagliardi v.
TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.4 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“I count [Van Gorkom]
not as a ‘negligence’ or due care case involving no loyalty issues but as an early, as of
its date not yet fully rationalized ‘Revlon’ or ‘change of control’ case.”); see also
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of
Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom
and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, n.39 (2002)
[hereinafter Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, Realigning the Standard] (“Van Gorkom . . . must
also be viewed as part of the Delaware courts’ effort to grapple with the huge increase
in mergers and acquisitions activity in the 1980s and the new problems that posed for
judicial review of director conduct.”); William T. Allen, The Corporate Director’s
Fiduciary Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule Under U.S. Corporate Law, in
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING
RESEARCH 307, 325 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998) (“In retrospect, [Van Gorkom] can
be best rationalized not as a standard duty of care case, but as the first case in which the
Delaware Supreme Court began to work out its new takeover jurisprudence.”); Black &
Kraakman, Hidden Value, supra note 53, at 522 (“Van Gorkom should be seen not as a
business judgment rule case but as a takeover case that was the harbinger of the then
newly emerging Delaware jurisprudence on friendly and hostile takeovers, which
included the almost contemporaneous Unocal and Revlon decisions.”); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 128 (1988)
(“Trans Union is not, at bottom, a business judgment case. It is a takeover case.”);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why A Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 51–52 (2002) (interpreting “the oft-maligned decision
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Under Van Gorkom, “Delaware entities are free to enter into
binding contracts without a fiduciary out [allowing them to take a better
offer] so long as there was no breach of fiduciary duty involved when
entering into the contract in the first place.”95 There is no “Revlon duty”
that compels a properly informed and motivated board of directors to act
otherwise.
3. No Special Duty to Get the Best Price
Although Delaware decisions conclusively demonstrate that
enhanced scrutiny does not impose a list of specific “Revlon duties,”
opinions continue to reference one supposedly overarching “Revlon
duty”: the duty to get the best price.96 This language is unfortunate
because it implies that unless enhanced scrutiny applies, directors need
not seek to maximize stockholder value.97 In my view, however, even
this is not a “Revlon duty,” because the duty to strive to maximize the
value of the corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants is the
universal, loyalty-based standard of conduct that directors of a Delaware

in Smith v. Van Gorkom” as addressing a breakdown in the group decision-making
process in which the board “blindly relied on Van Gorkom,” thereby enabling Van
Gorkom to not disclose and the board to not discover “key facts suggesting that the deal
was not as attractive as it seemed on first look”).
95. WaveDivision Holdings, LLC v. Millennium Digital Media Sys., L.L.C., No.
2993, 2010 WL 3706624, at *17 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2010); accord Corwin v. DeTrey,
16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 267, 273 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1989) (“[T]he directors of the selling
corporation are not free to terminate an otherwise binding merger agreement just
because they are fiduciaries and circumstances have changed.”).
96. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (“There is only
one Revlon duty—to ‘get the best price for the stockholders at the sale of the
company.’”); see also Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1993) (“In the sale of
control context, the directors must focus on one primary objective—to secure the
transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders—and they
must exercise their fiduciary duties to further that end.”).
97. See, e.g., Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 242 (“The duty to seek the best available price
applies only when a company embarks on a transaction—on its own initiative or in
response to an unsolicited offer—that will result in a change of control.”); Air Prods. &
Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 101 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“It is not until the board
is under Revlon that its duty ‘narrow[s]’ to getting the best price reasonably available
for stockholders in a sale of the company.”).
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corporation always must pursue. What changes under enhanced scrutiny
is not the standard of conduct but the standard of review.
Delaware corporate law is marked by a divergence between
standards of conduct and standards of review.98 The standard of conduct
supplies the substantive content for the core fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care: it describes what directors are expected to do.99 The standard
of review describes what a plaintiff must plead or prove to overcome a
defendant’s motion and ultimately prevail in the case.100 Courts apply
the latter to determine whether liability should be imposed, a transaction
be enjoined, or another equitable remedy be awarded.101 Regardless of
what standard of review applies, the directors’ standard of conduct does
not change. Moreover, in every situation, the standard of review is more
forgiving of directors and more onerous for stockholder plaintiffs than
the standard of conduct.102 This divergence is warranted for diverse
policy reasons typically cited as justifications for the business judgment
rule.103
Delaware law imposes two fiduciary duties on directors—the duty
of care and the duty of loyalty.104 In Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co., the Delaware Supreme Court stated that the duty of
care calls upon directors “to use that amount of care which ordinarily

98. See Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 519, 553–58 (2012); Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, Realigning the
Standard, supra note 94, at 451–52; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards
of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437,
461–67 (1993).
99. Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 437.
100. Id.
101. See Velasco, supra note 98, at 521; Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 437.
102. Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 454.
103. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (explaining
justifications for business judgment rule); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d
1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (same); Velasco, supra note 98, at 54 (explaining similar
justifications for divergence between standards of conduct and standards of review);
Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, Realigning the Standard, supra note 94, at 451–52 (same);
Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 444 (same).
104. Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 206 (Del. 2008) (“In discharging their
management function, ‘directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the
corporation and its shareholders.’”) (footnote omitted).
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careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances.”105 So
stated, the duty of care resembles the obligation to use reasonable care
that generally prevails in tort.106 This formulation describes the
standard of conduct. The standard of review is different. Depending on
the situation, the standard of review ranges from gross negligence, to
reasonableness, to fairness.
The duty of loyalty exhibits similar divergence. In Guth v. Loft,
Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court articulated a strict standard that
would seem to prohibit any conflict of interest.107 But again, this is the
standard of conduct. The standard of review ranges from a threshold
determination of materiality, to reasonableness, to fairness.
A subsidiary element of the duty of loyalty is the requirement that
directors act in good faith.108 The eBay decision teaches that when
managing a corporation, directors must seek “to promote the value of
the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”109 “[A] corporation
may take steps, such as giving charitable contributions or paying higher
wages, that do not maximize profits currently . . . because such activities
are rationalized as producing greater profits over the long-term.”110
Decisions of this nature benefit the corporation as a whole, and by

105. 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). As part of this obligation, “directors have a
duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material
information reasonably available to them. Having become so informed, they must then
act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000).
106. Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 439 (describing the standard of conduct as simply
“a special case of the duty of care imposed throughout the law . . . . [I]f a person
assumes a role whose performance involves the risk of injury to others, he is under a
duty to perform that role carefully . . . .”).
107. 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. 1939); see also Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary
Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1240 (2010) (discussing
Guth).
108. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
109. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010);
accord Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the
directors are to be employed for that end.”).
110. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Firms
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 147 n.34 (2012) [hereinafter Strine, ForProfit Firms].
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increasing the value of the corporation, the directors increase the share
of the corporation’s value beneficially owned by and available for the
residual claimants.111 Accordingly, Delaware decisions commonly refer
to directors owing fiduciary duties “to the corporation and its
shareholders.”112 This formulation captures the intuition that directors
owe duties to the corporation for the ultimate benefit of the residual
claimants.113 “[S]tockholders’ best interest must always, within legal
limits, be the end. Other constituencies may be considered only
instrumentally to advance that end.”114
As Henry Ford and the founder of craigslist learned, directors who
concededly act to benefit constituencies other than the stockholders
without explaining the instrumental rationale for doing so breach their
duty of good faith because they have admitted violating the applicable
standard of conduct.115 Similarly, special committee members have

111.
112.

Id. at 147–48.
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92,
99 (Del. 2007); accord Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (“The directors
of Delaware corporations stand in a fiduciary relationship not only to the stockholders
but also to the corporations upon whose boards they serve.”); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (“Our starting point is the
fundamental principle of Delaware law that the business and affairs of a corporation are
managed by or under the direction of its board of directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141(a) (2013). In exercising these powers, directors are charged with an unyielding
fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and to act in the best interests
of its shareholders.”); TW Servs. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1169,
1183 (Del. Ch. 1989) (describing as “non-controversial” the proposition that “the
interests of the shareholders as a class are seen as congruent with those of the
corporation in the long run”).
113. See Strine, For-Profit Firms, supra note 110, at 147–48.
114. See id. at 147 n.34.
115. This statement assumes that the certificate of incorporation has not modified
the directors’ managerial authority and concomitant duties. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any such
provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or
imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to
such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of
incorporation.”) (emphasis added). The language of Section 141(a) indicates that while
the duty of loyalty cannot be eliminated, it could be expanded or redirected to include
additional or different beneficiaries. Consequently, the principle that corporations must
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been found to have fallen short in challenges to transactions governed
by entire fairness when the directors did not understand that their job
was not to merely accept a fair transaction, but rather to seek the best
transaction available for the minority stockholders and strive for “the
highest possible price.”116
Absent an intentional or unwitting admission, the standard of
review for good faith once again diverges dramatically from the
standard of conduct. When the business judgment rule applies, a
reviewing court does not look closely at the motivations of the
directors.117
[B]ecause the board is disinterested and thus has no apparent motive
to do anything other than act in the best interest of the corporation
and its stockholders[,] . . . the court merely looks to see whether the
business decision made was rational in the sense of being one logical
118
approach to advancing the corporation’s objectives.

be operated for the benefit of the common stockholders is likely itself a default rule that
the parties to the corporate contract can modify. See id.; see also id. § 102(b)(1)
(authorizing the charter to contain “[a]ny provision for the management of the business
and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating,
defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the
stockholders . . . if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State”).
“[S]hareholders are not inherently privileged relative to other corporate constituents.
Instead, as with the rights of other corporate constituents, the rights of shareholders are
established through bargaining, even though the form of the bargain is a take-it-orleave-it standard form contract provided off-the-rack by the default rules of corporate
law and the corporation’s organic documents.” Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra
note 31, at 777.
116. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S’holder Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 870, 881
(Del. Ch. 1988) (observing that special negotiating committee members who
understood their obligation was only to determine fairness and not the maximization of
stockholder value had an “an imperfect appreciation of the proper scope and purpose of
such a special committee”); see In re First Bos., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 10338, 1990
WL 78836, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 7, 1990) (explaining that directors who serve on a
special committee to evaluate an interested transaction are expected “to approve only a
transaction that is in the best interests of the public shareholders, [and] to say no to any
transaction that is not fair to those shareholders and is not the best transaction
available”).
117. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch. 2010).
118. Id.; see also Thomas v. Kempner, 398 A.2d 320, 323–24 (Del. Ch. 1979);
Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Co., 126 A. 46, 48 (Del. Ch. 1924). See generally
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A court will infer bad faith and a violation of the duty of loyalty only
when a decision lacks any rationally conceivable basis for benefitting
stockholders.119
However, when a Delaware court applies enhanced scrutiny, the
metric for fiduciary duty review is range of reasonableness:
What is important and different about the Revlon [enhanced
scrutiny] standard is the intensity of judicial review that is applied to
the directors’ conduct. Unlike the bare rationality standard
applicable to garden-variety decisions subject to the business
judgment rule, the Revlon standard contemplates a judicial
examination of the reasonableness of the board’s decision-making
process. Although linguistically not obvious, this reasonableness
review is more searching than rationality review, and there is less
120
tolerance for slack by the directors.

Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 31, at 778 (“While the law clearly establishes
shareholder wealth maximization as one of the default contractual rights of
shareholders, the business judgment rule effectively precludes courts from reviewing
corporate decisions that allegedly further interests other than that of shareholder wealth
maximization.”) (footnote omitted); Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, Realigning the Standard,
supra note 94, at 452 (“[T]he business judgment review standard (‘rationality’)
diverges from, and becomes more lenient than, the normative standard of conduct
(‘reasonableness’).”) (footnote omitted).
119. See Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, Realigning the Standard, supra note 94, at 453
(defining an irrational decision as “one that is so blatantly imprudent that it is
inexplicable, in the sense that no well-motivated and minimally informed person could
have made it”); see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“Irrationality
is the outer limit of the business judgment rule. Irrationality may be the functional
equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show that the decision is not made in good
faith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule.”). The two possibilities
identified in Brehm are synonymous, because waste is defined as a transaction “so one
sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the
corporation has received adequate consideration,” i.e. no one could have reached such a
conclusion in good faith. Id. at 263; see also White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 553–55
(Del. 2001); W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co.,
Inc. S’holders Litig.), 542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“A court may, however,
review the substance of a business decision made by an apparently well motivated
board for the limited purpose of assessing whether that decision is so far beyond the
bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground
other than bad faith.”).
120. In re Netsmart Techs. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch. 2007);
accord Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 596 n.170 (quoting Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 192); In re
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In other words, when enhanced scrutiny applies, directors must provide
reasonable grounds to believe they acted in good faith.
If the standard of review increases to entire fairness, the range of
deference narrows to intrinsic fairness, and directors must prove their
good faith as part of that standard.121 What does not change regardless
of the standard of review is the underlying standard of conduct, which
requires that directors strive to maximize the value of the corporation for
the benefit of the corporation’s residual claimants, viz, its stockholders.
The duty of loyalty always imposes that core fiduciary obligation.122
In Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court
noted that Revlon “did not produce a seismic shift in the law governing
changes of corporate control.”123 Revlon’s holding instead follows
logically from the duty of loyalty that requires fiduciaries to strive to
maximize value when selling assets held for their beneficiaries.124

Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[In Revlon,]
the Supreme Court held that courts would subject directors subject to . . . a heightened
standard of reasonableness review, rather than the laxer standard of rationality review
applicable under the business judgment rule.”).
121. Evidence of bad faith can be sufficient to rebut the business judgment rule. See
Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 53 (Del. 2006)
(“Our law clearly permits a judicial assessment of director good faith for that former
purpose [of rebutting the business judgment rule].”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 40 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Under Delaware law, when a plaintiff
demonstrates the directors made a challenged decision in bad faith, the plaintiff rebuts
the business judgment rule presumption, and the burden shifts to the directors to prove
that the decision was entirely fair to the corporation and its stockholders.”); In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 760–79 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d
27, 50 (Del. 2006) (addressing whether board of directors breached its duties in
connection with termination of corporation’s president).
122. Freedman v. Rest. Assocs. Indus., Inc., 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651, 661 (Del. Ch.
1987); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 741 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (“Revlon
was not a radical departure from existing law (i.e., it has ‘always’ been the case that
when a trustee or other fiduciary sells an asset for cash, his duty is to seek the single
goal of getting the best available price) . . . .”); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v.
Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 802 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“Revlon . . . can be seen as an
application of traditional Delaware law: a fiduciary cannot sell for less when more is
available on similar terms.”).
123. 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 n.2 (Del. 1989).
124. Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1000 (noting that the obligation to maximize
stockholder value “is rooted in old trust principles and is mundane to those who believe
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Trustees who undertake to sell the res have always been expected to
strive to maximize value.125 This obligation translates into the law of
corporations when directors sitting in a fiduciary relationship with
stockholders seek to sell corporate assets or the corporation as whole.126
The bedrock principle that a board owes a duty to shareholders to act
only in pursuit of their interests is the principle that explains Revlon.
Where the company is to be sold, it cannot be in conformity with
that obligation to defeat a higher offer in favor of a lower one
regardless of other considerations. So understood, Revlon is
127
consistent with a very long line of cases.

Consequently, “Revlon was not a radical departure from existing law
(i.e., it has ‘always’ been the case that when a trustee or other fiduciary
sells an asset for cash, his duty is to seek the single goal of getting the
best available price).”128
Given these principles, it is incorrect, in my view, to say that the
duty to strive to maximize value is a “Revlon duty.” It is also
misleading because it would suggest that if enhanced scrutiny did not
apply, directors would not need to strive to maximize value. In reality,
the core value-maximizing duty does not arise only when enhanced
scrutiny is the standard of review. It always exists. What changes is

that stockholders are the only corporate constituency whose best interests are an end,
rather than an instrument, of the corporate form”).
125. See id.; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection
Measures in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 56 BUS. LAW. 919, 927 n.25 (2001)
[hereinafter Strine, Categorical Confusion] (stating that the “Revlon principle grows out
of the traditional principle that fiduciaries must sell trust assets for their highest value”
and citing Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 200 A.2d 441, 448 (Del. 1964), and
Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 126 A. 46, 49 (Del. Ch. 1924), as demonstrating
that principle).
126. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount
Commc’ns Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1993) (citing Wilmington Trust
Co., 200 A.2d 441, a trust case, as one of the sources of the directors’ duty to seek the
best transaction available for stockholders).
127. Freedman, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 661; see also City Capital Assocs. Ltd.
P’ship, 551 A.2d at 802 (“Revlon . . . can be seen as an application of traditional
Delaware law: a fiduciary cannot sell for less when more is available on similar
terms.”).
128. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 741 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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that a court looks to whether the directors acted reasonably in support of
this goal, rather than merely whether their conduct was rational.
Enhanced scrutiny is a standard of review, and there are no so-called
“Revlon duties.”
II. ENHANCED SCRUTINY LOGICALLY APPLIES TO PURE STOCK-FORSTOCK DEALS
Enhanced scrutiny is thus a standard of review that applies to
negotiated acquisitions because of concerns about potential conflicts.
Recognizing this fact has at least one major implication: enhanced
scrutiny should apply to all negotiated acquisitions. The Delaware
Supreme Court therefore can and should retire the Paramount doctrine.
A. CONCERN ABOUT CONFLICTS
Conflicts are not unique to Revlon deals. The CEO and members
of management can be retained or replaced by the acquirer after either a
Revlon deal or a stock-for-stock deal.129 Directors and executives may
receive transaction-related compensation or other employment benefits
in a Revlon deal or a stock-for-stock deal.130 A board and its
129. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 294 (3d ed. 2011) (citing empirical evidence that 50% of top executives
leave their employment within three years of a change of control); James F. Cotter &
Marc Zenner, How Managerial Wealth Affects the Tender Offer Process, 35 J. FIN.
ECON. 63, 88–94 (1994) (finding empirical support for proposition that managers resist
tender offers out of self-interest); Kenneth J. Martin & John J. McConnell, Corporate
Performance, Corporate Takeovers and Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671, 677
(1991) (“The dramatic increase in the turnover rate of top managers following
takeovers . . . indicates that takeovers are an important device for altering the top
management of target firms.”); James P. Walsh, Top Management Turnover Following
Mergers and Acquisitions, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2 (citing empirical evidence that
management turnover in acquired or merged firms was higher than standalone firms
over one, two, three, four, and five year periods); Jay C. Hartzell, et al., What’s In It for
Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 37, 37–61 (2004) (citing
empirical evidence that target CEOs are infrequently retained and that turnover for
target CEOs is significantly higher than CEOs of standalone companies; and reviewing
extensive literature yielding consistent results).
130. Chancellor Chandler commented on the irony of a transaction that is not a
“change-in-control” for purposes of QVC nevertheless triggering change-in-control
benefits when ruling on litigation challenging the board of Caremark RX, Inc.’s
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management could be just as enchanted or disenchanted with the
idiosyncrasies of a particular acquirer in a stock-for-stock deal as in a
Revlon deal. Indeed, management interests may loom largest in mergers
of equals, where “social issues,” like CEO-succession and board
composition, frequently rank among the most critical and heavily
negotiated aspects of the transaction.131 As then-Vice Chancellor Strine
decision to proceed with its stock-for-stock merger with CVS Corporation in the face of
a competing bid by Express Scripts, Inc.:
Even defendants such as Crawford, who will retain substantial authority as Chairman
[after the merger], benefit from this “change of control” acceleration of their options.
Defendants insist that this “merger of equals” does not, however, constitute a
corporate change of control for purposes of this Court’s jurisprudence under Revlon . .
. . This brings to mind Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty, who made a similar assertion
when he claimed that “[w]hen I use a word . . . it means just what I choose it to
mean—neither more nor less.”

La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1180 n.6 (Del. Ch.
2007). He regarded the Caremark directors’ position as having “a very Through the
Looking Glass feel to it.” Id. While recognizing that “words may change in legal
significance depending upon their context,” he nevertheless found it “an unfortunate
and disappointing spectacle” for “a board of directors [to] insist that it simultaneously
deserves the protection of the business judgment rule because the company is not
changing hands, while a massive personal windfall is bestowed because it is.” Id. In
Crawford, the Caremark directors also faced an additional subtle conflict, also
applicable regardless of the form of consideration: the existing merger agreement,
unlike a competing proposal, provided for broad third-party indemnification that could
extend to claims against directors for backdating stock options, which implicated the
duty of loyalty and raised questions about their good faith. Id. at 1189–90.
131. Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from
“Mergers of Equals,” 20 J. LAW & ECON. 60, 96 (2004) (citing empirical evidence
suggesting that target CEOs negotiate shared control in mergers in exchange for lower
deal premiums); Strine, Categorical Confusion, supra note 125, at 931 (“Is it not the
case that issues relating to managerial and board positions frequently dominate the
discussions?”); John C. Coates, IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy:
How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 858–59 & n.107
(1999) (noting that in most friendly deals the “managers and directors of the target
company will lose control over the future of the organization”); see also ROBERT E.
SPATT & ARIANA S. COOPER, SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, SOCIAL ISSUES IN
SELECTED RECENT MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS TRANSACTIONS 2004 – 2012
SUPPLEMENT (2012) (cataloguing the results of board and management negotiations
over control and governance of merged companies); Buhui Qiu & Fadi Yakoub, Do
Target CEOs Trade Premiums for Personal Benefits? Evidence from the Last Two
Merger Waves (Aug. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://business.uc.edu/content/dam/business/departments/finance/docs/CEO%20Retenti
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rhetorically asked in 2001, “[i]s it really the case that the directors and
managers are less likely to be acting to preserve their positions in a nonRevlon transaction?”132 Put simply, if potential conflicts drive enhanced
scrutiny, then enhanced scrutiny should apply to negotiated acquisitions,
regardless of the form of consideration.
B. CONCERN ABOUT DEFENSIVE MEASURES
When defensive measures are used to insulate a transaction, the
reduction in market oversight accentuates the risk that the transaction
may have been infected by self-interest.133 Defensive measures are just
as much of an issue in stock-for-stock deals as in Revlon deals.134
Stock-for-stock transactions regularly incorporate a suite of
defensive measures that practitioners and even Delaware decisions have
started to refer to as “standard merger terms.”135 This package includes

on%20and%20Severance%20Pay%2008182011-full%20copy.pdf (citing empirical
evidence suggesting that CEOs trade severance payments for deal premium).
132. Strine, Categorical Confusion, supra note 125, at 930.
133. See In re El Paso Corp. S’holders Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 444–45 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(observing that the loyalty issues raised by concealed motives and financial interests of
CEO and financial adviser led to negotiation failures that were “compounded by a deal
protection package that (1) precluded termination of the Merger Agreement if a
favorable bid for the E&P business emerged; and (2) made it very expensive for a
bidder for the pipeline business to make an offer because of the $650 million
termination fee and Kinder Morgan’s matching rights”); Griffith, Last Period, supra
note 44, at 1947 (“If the management team is able to protect the self-serving transaction
with deal protection provisions, it will be further insulated from the disciplinary effect
of the market for corporate control, leaving the outgoing management team free to
serve their own self-interest with relative impunity.”).
134. Although this Article argues only for the doctrinal equivalence of Revlon deals
and stock-for-stock deals, an article by then-Vice Chancellor Strine went a step further
and analogized stock-for-stock transactions to interested transactions. See Strine,
Categorical Confusion, supra note 125, at 939 (“Because of the importance of the
merger transactions and their profound effect on management’s future, deal protection
measures that protect management’s favored deal tend to give a stock-for-stock merger
agreement the flavor of an interested transaction.”).
135. In re 3Com S’holders Litig., No. 5067, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec.
18, 2009); accord In re Atheros Commc’ns, Inc., No. 6124, 2011 WL 864928, at *7
n.61 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) (quoting 3Com, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7); see also In re
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 261, 21 (Del. Ch.
2011) (referring to deal protections as “standard in form”); In re BJ’s Wholesale Club,
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a no-shop clause, restrictions on the board’s ability to provide
information in response to a competing bid, a matching right and other
restrictions on the board’s ability to terminate the agreement to accept a
competing bid, a healthy termination fee (with or without separate
expense reimbursement), and support agreements from significant
stockholders.136 If defensive measures can be problematic in Revlon
deals because they insulate management’s chosen transaction, then they
are equally problematic in stock-for-stock deals.
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that enhanced scrutiny
applies to the defensive measures used to protect a stock-for-stock
deal.137 In doing so, the court recognized the existence of potential

Inc. S’holders Litig., 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 311, 13 (Del. Ch. 2013) (observing that
combination of no-shop, match rights, termination fee, and force-the-vote provision has
“routinely been upheld”). But see In re Compellent Techs. Inc. S’holder Litig., No.
6084, 2011 WL 6382523, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011) (“M & A practitioners have
developed a taxonomy of familiar provisions that frequently appear in merger
agreements, such as no-shop clauses, information rights, matching rights, and
termination fees. Embracing these generic terms, the defendants have listed the types of
provisions found in the Original Merger Agreement and labeled them ‘customary.’ But
to identify defensive measures by type without referring to their details ignores the
spectrum of forms in which deal protections can appear.”); Crawford, 918 A.2d at 1181
n.10 (disagreeing that deal protections should be rubber-stamped as “customary”).
136. See AM. BAR ASS’N, 2012 STRATEGIC BUYER/PUBLIC TARGET MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS DEAL POINTS STUDY (2012) (detailing the use of deal protections,
including no-shops, no-talks, match rights, and breakup fees, in cash or stock
transactions over $100 million announced in 2011); see also ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re
Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 97–99, 108 (Del. Ch. 1999) (describing defensive measures in
merger agreement governing all-stock transaction; and observing the practice of
“imbed[ding] provisions in stock-for-stock mergers that are intentionally designed to
prevent another bidder, through a tender offer or rival stock-for-stock bid, from
preventing the consummation of a transaction”).
137. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 931 (Del. 2003)
(reaffirming the position that “defensive devices . . . must withstand enhanced judicial
scrutiny under the Unocal standard of review, even when that merger transaction does
not result in a change of control”); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time
Inc. S’holder Litig.), 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1989) (“structural safety devices” in a
merger agreement “are properly subject to a Unocal analysis”); accord McMillan v.
Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 506 n.62 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Under a ‘duck’ approach to
the law, ‘deal protection’ terms self-evidently designed to deter and make more
expensive alternative transactions would be considered defensive and reviewed under
the [Unocal] standard.”). See generally Strine, Categorical Confusion, supra note 125

2013]

REVLON IS A STANDARD OF REVIEW:
WHY IT’S TRUE AND WHAT IT MEANS

37

conflicts sufficient to justify enhanced scrutiny.138 If those conflicts are
sufficiently present to warrant reasonableness review of the defensive
measures, the same conflicts should be sufficiently present to warrant
reasonableness review of the transaction as a whole, thereby dispensing
with the Paramount doctrine.
C. THE LOGIC OF QVC
The logic of QVC itself supports eliminating the Paramount
doctrine and applying enhanced scrutiny more broadly to all negotiated
acquisitions. Carried to their logical conclusion, the principles on which
the Delaware Supreme Court relied to justify applying enhanced
scrutiny to the Paramount-Viacom combination militate in favor of
extending enhanced scrutiny to all stock-for-stock deals.
According to QVC, whether the post-transaction entity will have a
controlling stockholder makes a difference for the standard of review
because of the resulting loss in voting power inflicted on target
stockholders.139 Without procedural protections, “stockholder votes are
likely to become mere formalities.”140 Among other things, “minority
stockholders can be deprived of a continuing equity interest in their
corporation by means of a cash-out merger.”141 Having described these
potential consequences, the Delaware Supreme Court in QVC quickly
jumped to the concept of a control premium:
The acquisition of majority status and the consequent privilege of
exerting the powers of majority ownership come at a price. That
price is usually a control premium which recognizes not only the

(arguing for Unocal review of defensive measures in stock-for-stock merger
agreements).
138. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 928.
139. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount Commc’ns
Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1993) (“When a majority of a corporation’s
voting shares are acquired by a single person or entity, or by a cohesive group acting
together, there is a significant diminution in the voting power of those who thereby
become minority stockholders.”).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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value of a control block of shares, but also compensates the minority
142
stockholders for their resulting loss of voting power.

On the facts before it, the court held that “[b]ecause of the intended sale
of control, the Paramount–Viacom transaction has economic
consequences of considerable significance to the Paramount
stockholders.”143 A principal consequence was that once control shifted,
“the current Paramount stockholders [would] have no leverage in the
Therefore, the
future to demand another control premium.”144
Paramount directors “had an obligation to take the maximum advantage
of the current opportunity to realize for the stockholders the best value
reasonably available.”145
Restated in less lofty language, the QVC court applied enhanced
scrutiny because the Paramount-Viacom merger presented a one-time
opportunity to obtain value, and the Paramount board needed to go out
and get everything that it could.146 These propositions are equally true
for stock-for-stock deals.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
Id.
A strong argument can be made that QVC’s change-of-control rationale does
not justify elevating the standard of review because many decisions that boards make
have “economic consequences of considerable significance” for stockholders. Id.
Respect for board decision-making is generally not undermined by the magnitude of the
decision. See Regan, supra note 33, at 129 (“[T]he undisputed significance of a changeof-control transaction is, without more, an insufficient doctrinal basis to displace the
deference otherwise accorded to decisions made in good faith by informed and
disinterested directors, even in the context of a corporate takeover.”). What should be
required to elevate the standard of review is some form of actual or threatened conflict
that undermines the legal system’s confidence in the fiduciaries’ decisions. A potential
loss of voting power has significance, but significance does not necessarily mean
conflict, which arises from the divergent interests endemic to negotiated acquisitions
when managers and directors are (or perceive that they could be) in their final period.
The fact that the post-transaction entity would have a controlling stockholder
accentuates the final period problem because after the deal closes, the controller has
greater flexibility to restructure the entity at will. To protect against the uncertainty this
creates, managers may be more inclined to bargain in their own interests rather than
those of the stockholders. However, this is a matter of degree, not a difference in kind,
because every negotiated acquisition gives rise to the final period problem. Without the
taint of conflict, the change-in-control rationale is insufficient to support enhanced
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Although QVC accurately observed that the corollary of a changeof-control is usually some type of control premium, that is one of the
many instances in which correlation does not equate to causation.147
The potential for a change-in-control by itself does not confer value on
stockholders. For example, in a creeping acquisition, the acquirer builds
a controlling position without the board or other stockholders taking
notice.148 In a street sweep, the buyer quickly accumulates a large or
controlling position before the board or other stockholders can react.149
In both cases, the acquirer strives to avoid paying any control premium,
or at a minimum to avoid paying the premium for as many shares as
possible. That proposition can be generalized for rational acquirers: in
any acquisition, an acquirer will prefer to pay the lowest possible price
(and premium).150
Negotiated acquisitions are bargaining situations. Value is not
conferred charitably on sell-side stockholders; it must be extracted. If
scrutiny. Once the role of conflict is recognized, the change-in-control rationale is no
longer necessary.
147. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
148. See, e.g., Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 313 (Del.
Ch. 2010), aff’d, 15 A.3d 218 (Del. 2011) (finding adoption of rights plan was
reasonable response to threat of creeping acquisition); NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica
Inc., 997 A.2d 1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2009) (discussing possible responses to alleged creeping
acquisition by hedge fund); La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Fertita, No. 4339, 2009
WL 2263406, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 28, 2009) (declining to dismiss claim that board
breached its fiduciary duties by failing to employ a rights plan to block a creeping
acquisition attempt, when considered “together with other suspect conduct”).
149. Cf. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1337 (Del.
1987) (approving reasonableness of board’s facilitation of street sweep by friendly
investor).
150. See In re Dunkin’ Donuts S’holders Litig., 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1443, 1459
(Del. Ch. 1990) (“A bidder’s objective is to identify an underpriced corporation and to
acquire it at the lowest price possible. It is a straightforward investment decision. When
the bidder, as in the typical situation, owes no direct duty to stockholders, it has no
obvious reason to try to ‘maximize shareholder value.’ Indeed, its interest, if successful,
will minimize shareholder value.”); accord Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design
Sys., Inc., 789 A.2d 1216, 1227 (Del. Ch. 2001), aff’d sub nom., Mentor Graphics Corp.
v. Shapiro, 818 A.2d 959 (Del. 2003) (“The Dunkin’ Donuts Court recognized the
reality that bidders have economic interests that are inherently and structurally in
conflict with the target company’s stockholders’ interest in receiving maximum
available value. A bidder for control, like any rational buyer, wants (and has a fiduciary
duty to its own investors) to acquire the target company as cheaply as possible.”).
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an acquirer expects a transaction to generate synergies, the acquirer
should be willing to share a portion of the synergies with the target as
the price of getting the deal done and achieving the remaining gains. In
a cash deal, the gain-sharing takes the form of a higher dollar figure. In
a stock deal, the gain-sharing takes the form of a larger share of the
post-transaction entity. In either case, the gains are allocated through
negotiation.
The same is true for the control premium. Scholars have debated
the reasons why an acquirer would pay a premium to purchase
control.151 For purposes of the negotiation principle, the source of the
control premium does not matter. Regardless of its origins, the value of
control is something that the acquirer would prefer to keep rather than
share. The acquirer will share a portion of this value only if it is
extracted through negotiation. In a negotiated acquisition, the sell-side
fiduciaries act as bargaining agents for disaggregated stockholders.152
When sell-side fiduciaries obtain a premium for their stockholders, it
reflects their success in extracting a portion of the combinatorial value.
Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh has documented that sell-side
fiduciaries routinely bargain for premiums in pure stock-for-stock
transactions.153 This unsurprising finding demonstrates that even when

151. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of
Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119 (2005) (discussing varying
theories for source of control premium and their legal implications); Richard A. Booth,
Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings, 57 BUS. LAW.
127 (2001) (same); John C. Coates, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate
Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (1999)
(same).
152. See Brian J.M. Quinn, Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J.
CORP. L. 865, 878 (2007) (“Negotiated acquisitions are, in principle, bargaining
problems. Bargaining over price represents a division of the economic surplus between
the buyer and the seller.”) (footnote omitted); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1045 (1982)
(“Premiums are raised in unfriendly takeovers in which management actually seeks
competing offers, and in negotiated acquisitions in which management . . . bargain[s]
for increased premiums.”).
153. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some
Consequences in the Law of Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 881, 886 (2003)
(reporting a mean premium from 1999-2002 of 30% of stock-for-stock mergers versus
36% in cash acquisitions and a median premium of 28.26% for stock-for-stock mergers,
essentially identical to the median of 28.07% in cash acquisitions).
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ownership of a post-merger entity will remain in a “large, fluid,
changeable and changing market,”154 the merger negotiation creates a
unique opportunity to extract a share of the combinatorial value.
Moreover, the opportunity to extract value through a particular
negotiation is, by definition, unique to that negotiation. For humans,
time only runs one way. Once the negotiation is over and the deal
completed, the value exchanged in that negotiation cannot be
reallocated.
Readers of QVC often seem fixated on the Delaware Supreme
Court’s comment that “[o]nce control has shifted, the current Paramount
stockholders will have no leverage in the future to demand another
control premium,” inferring that if a future control premium could be
available, then enhanced scrutiny should not apply.155 This is a logical
fallacy. The statement that enhanced scrutiny will apply if no future
control premium is available does not imply that enhanced scrutiny will
not apply if a future control premium is available, any more than the
statement that coffee will be available if you arrive by 1:00 p.m. implies
that coffee will not be available if you arrive after 1:00 p.m. Coffee may
be available if you arrive after 1:00 p.m. You are just not guaranteed to
get it.156
Regardless, there is no corporate law limit of one premium per
stockholder. The control premium that could be extracted in a future
deal is just that—a share of the combinatorial value of the future deal. It
represents a separate and distinct negotiating opportunity for the future
board that is neither exclusive of nor co-extensive with the present
negotiating opportunity. Even if the stockholders of the merged
company may someday have an opportunity to have their future
fiduciaries extract a control premium on their behalf as part of a future
transaction, the exchange ratio fixed in the current stock-for-stock
merger would determine the post-merger ownership of the firm. The
stock-for-stock merger therefore represents the only time when the
selling stockholders of the acquired corporation can extract a premium

154. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount Commc’ns
Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v.
Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 739 (Del. Ch.
1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)).
155. Id. at 43.
156. This is simply a matter of propositional logic.
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from the buyer as the price of acquiring their current entity, because
their resulting ownership stake determines how much of any aggregate
future control premium the stockholders of the acquired corporation
receive.
Then-Vice Chancellor Strine made these same points in a 2001
article, in which he posited a stock-for-stock merger between two
corporations—Zuckerman and Angstrom—in which Zuckerman
stockholders would receive Angstrom shares. He explained that
regardless of whether the consideration was stock or cash, “the
Zuckerman stockholders arguably face[d] their last real chance to get
full value for the company.”157 Although the consolidated entity might
later be sold for a control premium,
[i]n the real world, this theoretical reality would provide little solace
to the Zuckerman stockholders. They would rightly be worried about
whether the current merger represented an unfair transfer of wealth
from the Zuckerman stockholders to the Angstrom stockholders.
That is, the fairness of the exchange ratio would be critical to the
Zuckerman stockholder because it fixes their claim on the assets of
the combined entity—and thus their share of any future control
premium. Put differently, the merger will be their final opportunity
to be afforded payment for their now exclusive ownership of
158
Zuckerman.

Exactly.
A board negotiating a pure stock-for-stock merger is therefore in a
position analogous to the Paramount board in QVC in both respects that
the Delaware Supreme Court found critical: (i) the merger negotiation
provides an opportunity to extract for the stockholders a share of
combinatorial value that the acquirer otherwise would prefer to keep,
and (ii) the opportunity is a one-time chance to obtain this value that
will not recur, even if the combined corporation can later be sold.159
Because these basic realities were deemed sufficient to impose enhanced

157.
158.
159.

Strine, Categorical Confusion, supra note 125, at 929–30.
Id. at 930.
See generally QVC, 637 A.2d 34.

2013]

REVLON IS A STANDARD OF REVIEW:
WHY IT’S TRUE AND WHAT IT MEANS

43

scrutiny in QVC, they should be sufficient for stock-for-stock deals
generally.160
D. DECISIONS INVOLVING MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVES
The Paramount doctrine also should be abandoned because it fails
to accommodate the reality that boards routinely confront a range of
strategic alternatives. One choice typically will be to go it alone.
Another may be to sell for cash. Yet another may be a recapitalization
in which a new investor will take a controlling equity stake. Still others
could involve stock-for-stock mergers with acquirers who may or may
not have controlling stockholders. And perhaps one of the potential
bidders will turn hostile. In my experience, unhampered by the current
formalism of Delaware law, directors typically ask the right question:
which of the alternatives provides the best risk-adjusted value for the
stockholders. But when lawyers steeped in the Paramount doctrine
enter the picture, they advise the directors that the different alternatives
are subject to different standards of review and that the obligation to
maximize stockholder value only arises sometimes. This advice can
skew the decision-making process by placing too much emphasis on
legal exposure and its potential mitigation via transaction structure.
Directors should not be distracted by the overly formal legalisms of
the Paramount doctrine. They should do (and be advised to do) what
they would naturally do: seek in good faith to obtain the best transaction
for the stockholders, which could well be no transaction at all.
Evaluating competing alternatives may be a complex and
judgment-laden task, but it is not impossible. To be certain, there are
real-world distinctions among alternatives that affect how a board
assesses the values of those alternatives. For example, when weighing a
transaction for consideration of 100% cash, the board may consider
obvious issues like the likelihood of closure, the timing of payment, and
tax effects.161 If the payment is in a foreign currency, the board might
160. See generally Morgan White-Smith, Revisiting Revlon: Should Judicial
Scrutiny of Mergers Depend on the Method of Payment?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1177
(2012).
161. See, e.g., In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 578 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(noting that when evaluating competing bids, the target board appropriately considered
relative antitrust risk and contractual provisions addressing regulatory issues, indicating
that “[v]alue is not value if it is not ultimately paid”).
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consider exchange rate risk.
The board may consider other
constituencies instrumentally, but only to the extent necessary to secure
the cash deal. Stay-bonuses to management, for example, may be
necessary to keep the management team together until closing to ensure
that the company is delivered intact to the buyer. However, the board
cannot consider the degree to which benefits to other constituencies
might generate greater corporate value over the long term.162 There
remains room for judgment, but the use of cash eliminates many of the
discretionary assessments that directors must make.
If the alternative is remaining independent, then a wider range of
judgmental factors comes into play. Most significantly, the board may
consider and give significant weight to the possibility that benefits to
constituencies other than the stockholders may result in superior value
creation over time such that when viewed on a present-value, riskadjusted basis, remaining independent would generate greater value for
stockholders than selling for cash. The board may also anticipate that
the company could be sold in the future for consideration which, when
viewed on a present-value, risk-adjusted basis, makes remaining
independent for the present the optimal choice. In making these
determinations, the board is not required to rely on a company’s stock
market price to conduct the projecting and discounting exercise.163 The
board is also not bound by the results of a discounted cash flow analysis
or other valuation technique. Directors are entitled to and must exercise
judgment.

162. TW Servs. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1169, 1184 (Del.
Ch. 1989) (“For [stockholders being eliminated for cash,] it does not matter that a buyer
who will pay more cash plans to subject the corporation to a risky level of debt, or that
a buyer who offers less cash will be a more generous employer for whom labor peace is
more likely.”).
163. Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 612 (“[O]ur law does not require a well-motivated
board to simply sell the company whenever a high market premium is available (such
as at a distress sale) or to eschew selling when a sales price is attractive in the board’s
view, but the market premium is comparatively low, because the board believes the
company is being valued quite fully.”); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re
Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 739 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (“But just as the Constitution does not enshrine Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s social statics, neither does the common law of directors’ duties elevate the
theory of a single, efficient capital market to the dignity of a sacred text.”).
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When evaluating a transaction where the consideration takes the
form of stock, the directors’ task more closely resembles the type of
analysis that a board would conduct regarding the alternative of
remaining independent. Because stockholders will receive an ownership
interest in an ongoing entity, the directors are entitled to consider how
that entity will generate value over the long-term. Just as when
considering the alternative of remaining independent, the board may
anticipate that the company could be sold at some point in the future. In
a synergistic transaction, directors may account for the value that would
be created by combining the two companies. Any or all of these factors,
when weighed by the board, may cause the directors to conclude that the
share of the entity that the corporation’s pre-transaction stockholders
would own post-transaction represents the best alternative available. To
the extent an alternative involves a combination of cash and stock, the
relative size of the equity stake that the selling stockholders receive
necessarily affects the degree to which value can be derived from the
ongoing business and any eventual sale of the combined entity. As in
the standalone setting, the board is not required to rely on the stock
market or the results of a discounted cash flow analysis.
In QVC, the Delaware Supreme Court called upon boards to make
precisely these types of determinations.164 The court explained that
when considering alternatives, “the directors should analyze the entire
situation and evaluate in a disciplined manner the consideration being
offered.”165 The court admonished that “[w]here stock or other non-cash
consideration is involved, the board should try to quantify its value, if
feasible, to achieve an objective comparison of the alternatives.”166 In a
footnote, the court stressed that “[w]hen assessing the value of non-cash
consideration, a board should focus on its value as of the date it will be
received by the stockholders.”167 In reiterating its prior holdings that
directors are not bound by the market price, the court stated that
“[n]ormally, such value will be determined with the assistance of

164. See generally Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. S’holder Litig.), 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
165. Id. at 44.
166. Id.
167. Id. at n.14.
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experts using generally accepted methods of valuation.”168 Therefore, a
board is “not limited to considering only the amount of cash involved”
and may account for “its view of the future value of a strategic
alliance.”169 The court also stressed that
the board may assess a variety of practical considerations relating to
each alternative, including an offer’s fairness and feasibility; the
proposed or actual financing for the offer, and the consequences of
that financing; questions of illegality; the risk of non-consummation;
the bidder’s identity, prior background and other business venture
experiences; and the bidder’s business plans for the corporation and
170
their effects on stockholder interests.

The flexible process described in QVC can apply just as easily to stockfor-stock deals as Revlon deals. If anything, the absence of a posttransaction controlling stockholder should make the analysis more
straightforward. In QVC, the post-transaction entity would have had a
single person as its controlling stockholder, making the value of the
strategic combination highly contingent.171 Without a post-transaction
controlling stockholder, the board should have greater confidence in and
be able to more readily assess “the future value of a strategic
alliance.”172
Directors must act in good faith and on an informed basis to pursue
a course that maximizes value for stockholders. This means that the
directors must reach the conclusion that the alternative they have chosen
does just that. Enhanced scrutiny, as a standard of review, does not
affect this core obligation, and QVC and its progeny demonstrate that
judgmental factors can be pivotal in the board’s calculation. Applying
enhanced scrutiny to stock-for-stock deals makes clear that even though
directors necessarily have greater occasion to weigh and assess
168. Id. at 44 (citing In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1132, 1161 (Del. Ch. 1989) (upholding Special Committee’s reliance on financial
advisor and finding “quite sufficient bases to conclude that the opinions of the Special
Committee’s advisors concerning prospective value of the respective packages (which
largely reduced to quite different assessments of the relative values of the converting
debentures and the convertible preferred) were competent and reached in good faith”).
169. Id.
170. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
171. See generally id.
172. Id. at 44.
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judgmental factors when stockholders will hold or receive equity, the
directors must conclude that the course they have adopted best
maximizes value for stockholders, regardless of the transactional form
selected. Overruling the Paramount doctrine reunites the legal advice
with the business reality facing the board.
E. THE REASONABLENESS OF REVLON REVIEW
For many, the desire to distinguish between Revlon deals and stockfor-stock transactions appears driven by the belief that Revlon imposes
specific conduct obligations on directors. Under this view, Revlon is
like the bogey-man. It is big and bad and should be avoided if possible.
As already discussed, Revlon does not impose specific conduct
obligations and need not be feared.
That said, any change in the standard of review, however small and
theoretically tidy, could have knock-on effects for litigation. Given the
high stakes involved in M&A lawsuits, courts must approach any
tinkering with great care. On this point, there is good news. Applying
enhanced scrutiny to stock-for-stock deals will not change the way
Delaware courts review transactions or affect the already excessive
number of lawsuits challenging deals. Although the standards of review
under the Paramount doctrine nominally remain separate, in terms of
actual litigation practice, the two types of transactions already have
merged.
1. No Effect on Litigation Volume
If enhanced scrutiny caused stock-for-stock transactions to be
examined more strictly, one logical consequence should include an
increase in the number of suits against stock-for-stock deals and greater
associated transaction costs. As a practical matter, in the current
litigation environment, stockholder plaintiffs do not discriminate
between Revlon deals and stock-for-stock deals.173 Plaintiffs file and
173. See Leo E. Strine Jr., et al., Putting Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed
Complaint 9–10 (Jan. 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2200499 (“In 2010 and 2011, 91%
of all deals worth over $100 million were litigated, and these deals were targeted with
an average of 5.1 lawsuits each.”) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also
ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT
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seek pre-closing injunctive relief by alleging breaches of the duty of
disclosure, which applies to all transactions, and by challenging the
defensive provisions in the merger agreement, which are governed by
enhanced scrutiny regardless. The vast majority of M&A lawsuits settle
for supplemental disclosures and an award of attorneys’ fees, regardless
of the form of consideration.174
2. No Distinction in the Injunction Phase
If a case proceeds to a decision during the injunction phase, there is
no distinction in how the Delaware courts handle Revlon deals versus
stock-for-stock deals. In both contexts, the Delaware courts examine the
disclosures and defensive measures, and then leave the decision on
value to the stockholders.
When considering an injunction application, a Delaware court
initially focuses on whether stockholders have the necessary information
to vote on the transaction, including information about actual and
potential conflicts. The court then defers to the stockholders’ decision.
When a plaintiff asks the Court of Chancery “to enjoin a transaction and
another higher-priced alternative is not immediately available, [the
court] has been appropriately modest about playing games with other
people’s [i.e., the stockholders’] money.”175 This is true even when the
plaintiff has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits.176
After all, even when a sufficient merits showing is made by a
plaintiff, this court is justifiably reluctant to enjoin a premiumgenerating transaction when no other option is available, except
insofar as is necessary for the disclosure of additional information to

DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
3 (2012) (providing statistics supporting theory that all transactions regardless of form
of consideration are litigated).
174. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 173, at 8 (cataloging the disposition of
565 challenged transactions in 2010-2011, finding “153 (27 percent) were voluntarily
dismissed by the plaintiffs, twenty-three (4 percent) were dismissed by the court with
prejudice, and 389 (69 percent) settled,” and noting the “large majority of settlements . .
. settled for additional disclosures only”).
175. In re Netsmart Techs. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 208 (Del. Ch. 2007).
176. See generally In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 715
(Del. Ch. 2001).
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permit stockholders to make an informed decision whether to
177
tender.

There is no Paramount doctrine for disclosure issues. In a stockfor-stock transaction, just as in a Revlon deal, directors must make a
merger recommendation.178 In both contexts, directors must comply
with their fiduciary duty of disclosure.179 If disclosure deficiencies
threaten to render the stockholder vote uninformed, Delaware courts
regularly find that irreparable harm exists and enjoin the vote pending
the issuance of supplemental disclosures.180 “By issuing an injunction
177. Id.; accord In re El Paso Corp. S’holders Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 433 (Del. Ch.
2012) (finding reasonable likelihood of success on merits but denying preliminary
injunction where “the stockholders of El Paso, as the seller, have a choice whether to
turn down the Merger themselves”); In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573,
618 (Del. Ch. 2010) (ruling that balance of harms tilted against injunction because
stockholders could decide for themselves to vote deal down and take the chance of
receiving an actionable higher bid); In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 516
(Del. Ch. 2010) (“[W]here a selling Board’s alleged Revlon violations occur in the
absence of another viable bid, this Court often finds injunctive relief to be inappropriate
because it would be imprudent to terminate the only deal available, when the
stockholders can make that decision for themselves.”) (footnote omitted); In re Toys
“R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1023 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[T]he bottom line is
that the public shareholders will have an opportunity . . . to reject the merger if they do
not think that the price is high enough in light of the Company’s stand-alone value and
other options.”); H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., 23 DEL. J. CORP. L.
633, 12 (Del. Ch. 1997) (declining to enjoin vote on friendly merger to allow
stockholders first to elect hostile bidder’s nominees: “If Great Western’s shareholders
wish to elect Ahmanson’s nominees to the board, they need only vote down the
Washington Mutual merger proposal at the merger meeting, and then vote for
Ahmanson’s nominees at the rescheduled annual meeting”).
178. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)-(c) (2013).
179. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (“[D]irectors of Delaware
corporations are under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material
information within the board’s control when it seeks shareholder action.”); Zirn v. VLI
Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1057 (Del. 1996) (finding a disclosure violation in a cash
transaction where a partial disclosure was “misleading”); Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav.
Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994) (finding a potential disclosure violation
in a stock-for-stock transaction where “partial disclosures” were “misleading”).
180. See, e.g., Berger v. Pubco Corp., No. 3413, 2008 WL 2224107, at *4 (Del. Ch.
May 30, 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 976 A.2d 132 (Del. 2009) (“A disclosure
violation results in an irreparable injury.”); Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 207 (“[T]his court
has typically found a threat of irreparable injury to exist when it appears stockholders
may make an important voting decision on inadequate disclosures.”); Allen v. News
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requiring additional disclosure, the court gives stockholders the choice
to think for themselves on full information, thereby vindicating their
rights as stockholders to make important voting and remedial decisions
based on their own economic self-interest.”181
Delaware courts also examine the deal-protection devices in the
As already explained, there is no Paramount
merger agreement.
doctrine here either, and the standard of review is always enhanced
scrutiny.182 From a practical standpoint, because Delaware courts
examine the defensive measures in stock-for-stock merger agreements
using enhanced scrutiny, the Delaware courts are already reviewing the
transaction process in precisely the same manner as they would if
enhanced scrutiny applied to the transaction as a whole. A reviewing
court must conduct this analysis because when directors develop greater
information about alternatives and conduct greater price-discovery
before signing a deal, the directors can reasonably grant greater deal
protections in connection with the deal. By contrast, when directors are
less informed, their lack of knowledge calls for retaining greater
flexibility for price-discovery and the development of alternatives to
occur after signing.183 The judicial task of determining whether the
Corp., No. 979, 2005 WL 415095, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 2005) (“At this early stage,
plaintiffs have demonstrated a ‘sufficiently colorable claim’ that the disclosures
contained in News’ proxy materials are materially deficient or misleading and that there
is a ‘possibility of a threatened irreparable injury,’ namely the loss of the ability by the
Fox shareholders to have all pertinent information available at the time they decide
whether to tender their shares into the exchange offer, if expedition is not granted.”)
(footnote omitted); In re MONY Group Inc. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 18 (Del. Ch.
2004) (“This disclosure violation threatens irreparable harm because stockholders may
vote ‘yes’ on a transaction they otherwise would have voted ‘no’ on if they had access
to full or nonmisleading disclosures regarding the CICs.”).
181. Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 207.
182. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 931 (Del. 2003);
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 571 A.2d
1140, 1151 (Del. 1989).
183. See David Fox & Daniel Wolf, Deal Protection: One Size Does Not Fit All,
PRAC. L. J. (Mar. 2010) (noting that the extensiveness of a pre-signing market check
ought to be considered in evaluating the use of deal protections); Mark Lebovitch &
Peter B. Morrison, Calling a Duck a Duck: Determining the Validity of Deal Protection
Provisions in Merger of Equals Transactions, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 51–52
(2001) (“Under the framework that we believe the Delaware courts are applying, the
severity of the particular Deal Protections used bears a positive correlation to the need
for a thorough market check and/or broad fiduciary out. Put simply, not all Deal
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directors acted reasonably in protecting their transaction is not
appreciably different from determining whether the directors acted
reasonably in selecting their transaction.
3. No Distinction in the Post-Closing Phase
For those cases that reach the post-closing phase, there is still no
distinction between stock-for-stock transactions and Revlon deals.
The fact that a corporate board has decided to engage in a change of
control transaction invoking so-called Revlon duties does not change
the showing of culpability a plaintiff must make in order to hold the
directors liable for monetary damages. For example, if a board
unintentionally fails, as a result of gross negligence and not of bad
faith or self-interest, to follow up on a materially higher bid and an
exculpatory charter provision is in place, then the plaintiff will be
barred from recovery, regardless of whether the board was in
184
Revlon-land.

Complaints against Revlon transactions are subject to dismissal on the
pleadings for failure to plead facts sufficient to overcome an exculpatory
charter provision.185 Challenges to Revlon transactions are likewise
Protections function in a similar fashion, boards can perform market checks of varying
intensity, and boards can adopt fiduciary outs of varying breadth. Therefore, the
framework operates on a sliding scale.”); Mark A. Morton & Roxanne L. Houtman, GoShops: Market Check Magic or Mirage? (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2007/05/20070509%20Go%20Shops—
Market%20Check%20Magic%20or%20Mirage.pdf (“A transaction that follows a full
auction or involves multiple bidders may warrant more restrictive deal protections, such
as a higher termination fee, a matching right and a more limited no shop provision,
because the market has been canvassed for potential bidders.”).
184. McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 502 (Del. Ch. 2000).
185. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1085–95 (Del. 2001) (holding
“that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cognizable claim [under Revlon]”
and that “even if plaintiffs had stated a claim for gross negligence, such a well-pleaded
claim is unavailing because defendants have brought forth the Section 102(b)(7)
[exculpatory] charter provision”); see also In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. S’holders
Litig., 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 311, 7 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The [c]omplaint does not allege
facts that support a reasonable inference that the Board consciously disregarded its socalled Revlon duties.”); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 641 (Del. Ch.
2008) (“[W]here . . . the directors are protected by an exculpatory charter provision, it is
critical that the complaint plead facts suggesting a fair inference that the directors
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susceptible to motions for summary judgment unless the plaintiff can
produce evidence that the board “utterly failed to attempt to attain” the
transaction offering the best value for stockholders.186
Even for directors serving those rare corporations without
exculpatory provisions in their charters, the approach to determining
liability should not change. A transactional standard of review is, at its
core, an inquiry designed to address whether the court should respect the
transaction itself or whether, for equitable reasons, it should set it aside
or impose an alternative remedy. The court’s analysis of the transaction
“has only a crude and potentially misleading relationship to the liability
of any particular fiduciary.”187 Director culpability is assessed and a
potential damages remedy imposed on a director-by-director basis.188
The likelihood of an actual liability finding remains low for directors
who did not receive transaction-specific benefits. Therefore, applying

breached their duty of loyalty by making a bad faith decision to approve the merger for
reasons inimical to the interests of the corporation and its stockholders. Where a
complaint . . . does not even create an inference of mere negligence or gross negligence,
it certainly does not satisfy the far more difficult task of stating a non-exculpated duty
of loyalty claim.”); McMillan, 768 A.2d at 496 (“[T]he complaint alleges no facts from
which a reasonable inference can be drawn that any conflicting self-interest or bad faith
motive caused the defendant directors to fail to meet their obligations to seek the
highest attainable value.”); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 731–32
(Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d sub nom., Walker v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000) (“If
a complaint merely alleges that the directors were grossly negligent in performing their
duties in selling the corporation, without some factual basis to suspect their
motivations, any subsequent finding of liability will, necessarily, depend on finding
breaches of the duty of care, not loyalty or good faith.”).
186. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 244 (Del. 2009).
187. Venhill Ltd. P’ship v. Hillman, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 982, 22 (Del. Ch. 2008)
(discussing the entire fairness standard of review).
188. See In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 16,415, 2004 WL
1305745, at *38–43 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (“The liability of the directors must be
determined on an individual basis because the nature of their breach of duty (if any),
and whether they are exculpated from liability for that breach, can vary for each
director.”); see also GPC XLI L.L.C. v. Loral Space & Commc’ns Inc. (In re Loral
Space & Commc’ns Inc.), 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 670, 22 (Del. Ch. 2008) (assessing
individual culpability of members of a special negotiating committee in approving an
interested transaction with a controlling stockholder); Venhill, 2008 WL 2270488, at
*29–33 (assessing the culpability of the general partner in executing self-interested
transactions and fashioning an appropriate remedy).
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enhanced scrutiny to all negotiated acquisitions, regardless of the form
of consideration, should not affect litigation rates or outcomes.
III. A CALL TO CLARIFY THE LAW
In my view, Delaware law could be helpfully clarified and
simplified if the Delaware Supreme Court clearly announced that
(i) Revlon is a form of enhanced scrutiny, and (ii) enhanced scrutiny
applies to negotiated acquisitions, regardless of the form of
consideration, because of the final period problem. Only the Delaware
Supreme Court sitting en banc can accomplish this change because it
would require overruling the Paramount doctrine.
Recognizing Revlon as a form of enhanced scrutiny that turns on
reasonableness would foreclose still-recurring arguments about the
parameters of so-called “Revlon duties” and what actions are supposedly
required (or forbidden) in the “radically altered state.”189 This limited
exercise in doctrinal pruning also would eliminate the debate over what
standard of review should apply to mergers in which the consideration is
a mix of cash and stock. Parties in litigation over mixed consideration
transactions currently devote significant resources to debating the
standard of review. Likewise, parties litigating pure stock-for-stock
transactions would not have to differentiate in their briefing between the
merger itself, to which the business judgment rule now applies, and the
defensive measures in the merger agreement, to which enhanced
scrutiny applies. Parties in both settings would know that enhanced
scrutiny was the standard of review, allowing them to focus their efforts
on presenting or attacking the reasonableness of the board’s purposes
and the means selected to achieve them.
More importantly, by making this announcement, the Delaware
Supreme Court would give clear guidance to directors and advisors that
a board of directors of a Delaware corporation must always seek to
maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of the
undifferentiated equity, and that the only factor that changes from a
legal standpoint is the standard of review used to evaluate the directors’
decisions. When faced with competing strategic alternatives involving
different forms of consideration, directors could focus squarely on
189. TW Servs. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1169, 1185 (Del. Ch.
1989).
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seeking the best transaction reasonably available for the stockholders
rather than being told that different third-party transaction structures
would subject them to different duties or different standards of review.
For reasons already discussed, changing the law in this fashion
should not alter the substance of how mergers are reviewed. It would
not create an expanded universe of transactions in which directors must
conduct auctions or follow judicially drafted checklists, precisely
because there is no such universe to begin with. Nor would it require
boards to eschew stock transactions in favor of cash deals.
In fact, under this approach, Time-Warner would have come out
precisely the same way. The proof lies in Chancellor Allen’s trial court
decision, where after distinguishing Revlon, he conducted the type of
enhanced scrutiny analysis that this Article envisions under the heading
of a separate application of Unocal review. After weighing the
evidence, he concluded that the Time board had carried its burden of
proof and showed that it reasonably believed, in good faith, that in the
long run, the Time-Warner combination would produce greater benefits
to stockholders than Paramount’s cash bid would.190 The value available
to Time’s post-transaction stockholders included not only the present
value of the long-term benefits achievable through the combination, but
also the present value of the possibility of a control premium in a future
sale.191 A board considering a stock-for-stock transaction could rely on
these and other considerations to conclude that the value of the stockfor-stock alternative was the best transaction reasonably available.
CONCLUSION
“[I]n the law, to an extent present in few other human institutions,
there may be in the long run as much importance ascribed to the
reasoning said to justify action, as there is in the actions themselves.”192
Revlon did not sufficiently or clearly explain why enhanced scrutiny
190. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.),
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 733 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)
(“Directors may operate on the theory that the stock market valuation is ‘wrong’ in
some sense, without breaching faith with shareholders. No one, after all, has access to
more information concerning the corporation’s present and future condition.”).
191. See id. (noting that the combined entity would not be too large to acquire).
192. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1132, 1156 n.13
(Del. Ch. 1989).
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applied, and the powerful metaphor of director-auctioneers
overwhelmed other aspects of the opinion.193 Delaware decisions now
consistently recognize that the Delaware Supreme Court applied
enhanced scrutiny in Revlon because of concern about potential conflicts
of interest.194 This rationale applies equally to stock-for-stock deals.195
By issuing an opinion overruling the Paramount doctrine and applying
enhanced scrutiny to stock-for-stock deals, the Delaware Supreme Court
would confirm that Revlon is a form of enhanced scrutiny and provide a
comprehensible and coherent rationale for how the Delaware courts
approach negotiated acquisitions.
It also would simplify an
unnecessarily complex area of Delaware jurisprudence. These benefits
in turn will enhance the legitimacy of Delaware’s legal system.

193.
194.
195.

See discussion supra Part I.A.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
See discussion supra Part II.

